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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense (DOD), private sector industry, and academia nearly 
universally agree that change in cyberspace is constant. This cyberspace change may be 
anticipated, but important dynamics are unpredictable or uncertain. To manage, mitigate, 
or anticipate change, an organization must strategize to be responsive to changes it cannot 
precisely predict. The DOD does not have the breadth and depth of expertise needed to 
prepare for these changes and tends to be slow to address unpredictability and uncertainty 
in cyberspace change in its strategy. 
This thesis investigates whether the private sector has strategy lessons that can be 
adapted or adopted by the DOD to build better and more robust multi-
stakeholder strategies to address unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change. 
Publicly available industry strategies were analyzed from a range of large and 
small organizations. Comparison of DOD/government and industry strategies 
demonstrated a higher degree of specificity and inclusion of significant strategic 
elements within industry strategy, which can be used to inform DOD strategy. 
Recommendations include developing a new strategy of cyberspace systems 
integration and utilizing observed measures of success, milestones and timelines, and 
specificity in industry practices that can decrease ambiguity identified in DOD 
cyberspace strategy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD), private sector industry, and academia nearly 
universally agree that change in cyberspace is constant. This cyberspace change may be 
anticipated, but important dynamics are unpredictable or uncertain. Many advanced 
analyses speak to the interrelationships of change, economies, politics, and cyberspace, and 
the uncertainties these interrelationships create.  
Unpredictability and uncertainty are distinct types of cyberspace change.1 These 
dynamics make vulnerabilities to malicious hacking, cybercrime and state-sponsored 
cybertheft immediate risks to national security, critical infrastructure, and commerce. To 
manage, mitigate, or anticipate change, an organization must strategize to be responsive to 
changes it cannot precisely predict. The DOD is less well-suited than other types of 
organizations for this kind of strategic planning. It does not have all the breadth and depth 
of expertise it needs to prepare for unpredictable change and tends to be slower to address 
unpredictability and uncertainty in cyberspace change in its strategy. 
Strategy to address this unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change is an 
organizational challenge and similarly faced by private and public sector organizations. 
This thesis investigates whether the private sector has strategy lessons that can be adapted 
or adopted by the DOD to build better and more robust multi-stakeholder strategy to 
address unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change. This first chapter begins that work 
by elaborating the problem of building effective strategy in the dynamically uncertain 
conditions of cyberspace.  
A. UNPREDICTABLE AND UNCERTAIN CYBERSPACE CHANGE 
STRATEGY (UUCCS) CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS 
The foundational question this thesis asks is, “What lessons can the DOD realize 
from private sector strategies for innovation and change to build better and more robust 
multi-stakeholder cyberspace change strategy that anticipates uncertainty and 
 
1 Unpredictable change and uncertain change in cyberspace are further defined in Chapter I.A.3. 
2 
unpredictable future cyberspace change?” In the absence of literature to answer this 
question directly, this thesis brings together several fields of related work and private sector 
experience on unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change and strategy to collate 
lessons-learned and recommendations to the DOD.  
In answering this core question, several sub-questions further clarify UUCCS 
lessons learned from the private sector: Which of those strategies are the most successful, 
and what measurements are used to determine that success? Which strategies might 
translate into the public sector? Which strategies might help the DOD become more 
efficient and effective and maintain a competitive edge in cyberspace? To answer these 
questions, the definition for cyberspace for this thesis is a broad umbrella concept that 
integrates many elements in the private and public sector: technological hardware, 
software, networking, infrastructure, data, acquisitions, policy and governance, as well as 
the people responsible for research and development (R&D), engineering, manufacture, 
supply, sales, maintenance, operations, integration, offense and defense, utilization and 
daily use of such technology. Changes to any of these elements affect the other elements, 
some in anticipated ways and others in unpredictable or uncertain ways.  
1. Contextual Alignment to the DOD Imperative for Partnerships with 
Industry 
The DOD and U.S. Government strategies researched for this thesis—The National 
Cyber Strategy 2018, DOD National Defense Strategy 2018, DOD Cyber Strategy 2018, 
USCYBERCOM Command Vision to Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority 2018 
(White House, 2018; United States Department of Defense, 2018b; United States 
Department of Defense, 2018a; U.S. Cyber Command, 2018)—all have many imperatives 
to partner with the private sector. These imperatives acknowledge private sector cutting-
edge approaches, vast experience, and scope of ownership of technology and methodology 
that the DOD may not currently utilize to the same extent. Understanding how private 
sector partnerships and capabilities contribute to the public sector maximizes potential to 
leverage those capabilities.2 Acknowledging the private sector’s role means recognizing 
 
2 See Chapters I.C.a, II.A, and III.A.1. 
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that the DOD is not the sole provider of strategic leadership in defense or development of 
the nation’s critical infrastructure or technology; private sector cyberspace security and 
technology organizations have been successfully strategizing and practicing innovation for 
decades to maintain their competitive edge and protect their assets. To leverage this 
experience and success is the very impetus for partnership. 
This thesis aligns to the imperative for partnership at a fundamental level by 
analyzing and publishing the lessons learned and contribution of the private sector 
strategies as an academic-military and private sector partnership. The lessons-learned 
generated from these private sector strategies are recommended contributions to the multi-
stakeholder model for sound, anticipatory strategy that sharpens the competitive edge 
desired by both industry and the DOD in their respective areas of responsibility, from 
which both sectors would benefit.  
2. Anticipated, Unpredictable, and Uncertain Change in Cyberspace: 
Context of Moore’s Law and Other Innovations 
Moore’s Law is one of many indicators of change in cyberspace and contextualizes 
the exponential rate-of-change in transistor capacity and its effects in cyberspace over time. 
Simply put, the more transistors on an integrated circuit board, the effect is more storage 
and processing capability for that chip (Strawn & Strawn, 2015; TOP500.org, 2019). Many 
other technologies are enabled by transistor capacity and change as a natural evolution so 
quick that measurement and quantification is difficult. 
Cyberspace change is not limited to Moore’s Law, and includes other innovations 
like quantum computing, parallel processing, microelectronics, and significant price-
performance efficiencies. Some change can be anticipated, such as Moore’s Law and the 
exponential growth rate of periodically doubling transistor capacity. Some change is more 
unpredictable and uncertain, such as a disruptive technology. This unpredictability can be 
in the introduction of a technology itself, or in second- or third- order effects, where a new 
technology enables subsequent technology to grow in capability and market share. A good 
example of unpredictability is the U.S. Government declassifying geolocation technology, 
4 
making it available for public use. Since then, many technologies use geolocation 
capabilities in ways that were unanticipated by the original designers of the system.  
These types of unanticipated uses of technology have significant and swift impact 
on subsequent technologies and the businesses that produce and utilize them. In this sense, 
Moore’s Law has become a broader metaphor representing the uncertainty and 
transformative potential, as well as the exponential speed, of cyberspace change.  
3. Anticipated, Unpredictable, and Uncertain Change Distinction 
Complexity in cyberspace and interactions between varied technological, user, 
cultural, and government factors introduce second- and third- order effects in cyberspace 
change that become harder to predict. The importance of such unpredictability traces at 
least to Clausewitz in the mid-1800s. In Clausewitz’s foundational book On War, after his 
experience in the Napoleonic wars, he described a concept now referred to as “the fog of 
war,” where factors out of control of the commander influence the outcome of a battle and 
cause friction and difficulties (Keller & Widger, 2019). It is this friction and these factors 
that contribute to and provide the foundation of the definitions of unpredictability and 
uncertainty for this thesis.  
Demchak (2012) applies this concept to cyberspace and explains the differentiation 
between unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change. Unpredictable change means the 
novel, rogue, or innovative friction that an organization does not comprehend, plan for, or 
accommodate in advance. Uncertain change entails unpredictability but can include 
anticipated behavior in form or frequency of an event, competitor, or adversary, where the 
when and how of the anticipated behavior is unknown. Thus, an organization might 
anticipate the change and could mitigate in advance through a competitive or technological 
posture, depending on the effort of the organization. Demchak’s explanation of 
unpredictable and uncertain change is used as a definition for this thesis. 
The distinctions between anticipated, unpredictable, and uncertain change have 
significant strategic implications. Anticipated change is much easier to identify and 
strategize for; it makes sense logically, can be measured easily, and has effects and nuances 
that can be comprehended by common sense. Unpredictable or uncertain change is 
5 
theoretically impossible to anticipate completely and causes difficulty for decision makers. 
Organizational planning in an environment of unpredictable or uncertain change requires 
careful consideration for UUCCS, including both defensive positioning and proactive 
posturing. Unpredictable or uncertain change can span the spectrum of situations from 
market competition to cybersecurity.3  
B. DEVELOPING UUCCS IS A WICKED PROBLEM 
Cyberspace is a complex system, meaning that due to the sheer scale of interactions 
of independent elements or agents, outcomes are often hard or impossible to predict by 
simply looking at the individual interactions (Emmott, 2006). The complexity of the 
unpredictability and uncertainty in cyberspace makes strategizing for organizational 
success a “wicked problem.” Explaining this concept, McMillan and Overall (2016) 
describe complexity as entailing disorder, uncertainty, volatility, unpredictable 
consequences, and disruptions. Poorly structured problems stem from complexity due to 
conflicts and value variability with multiple stakeholders and particularly from a constant 
requirement for change. McMillan and Overall question whether strategy makers are truly 
capable of properly aligning decisions to poorly structured problems. Because of these 
poorly structured problems, the strategist therefore has difficulty knowing where to direct 
the organization, and consequently cannot determine how to reach objectives, which is the 
wicked problem. McMillan and Overall conclude that solving wicked problem requires a 
mindset capable of managing multilayered and complex circumstances. 
Explaining cyberspace change as a wicked problem, Demchak (2012) argues that 
because cyberspace technology is built on previous technology, it is not entirely 
unknowable. Instead, surprises occur due to the “complexity [of] misplaced trust, opaque 
ownership, and socio-political impunity” in cyberspace (p. 264). These surprises include a 
spectrum of layers, from basic and inherent vulnerabilities of manmade products to highly 
skilled, intentional malicious actors who attack with precision and must be disrupted before 
gaining access to an organization’s cyberspace infrastructure. Demchak argues that cyber 
 
3 Further discussed in Chapter II.E.3.  
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resilience is the primary and most economic posture and response to most unpredictability 
and uncertainty, but only active disruption might address the most devastating malicious 
actors’ efforts before they gain access to an organization’s cyberspace capabilities.  
Further complexity stems from the interaction of individual elements of cyberspace 
change (rate of change, individual technologies, stakeholders, designs and intents of good, 
neutral, and malicious actors, strategy). The relational complexity causes challenges in 
strategic direction, consensus, and implementation, and is therefore a wicked problem for 
both private and public sectors. This complexity is magnified in the U.S. Government and 
the DOD due to complex interactions between increasingly numerous and disparate 
stakeholders, requirements, duties, adversaries and competitors.4 Consequently, strategies, 
decisions, and implementation take tremendous effort, time, resources, consensus building, 
and the fundamentally complex mindset as proposed by McMillan and Overall to solve this 
wicked problem.  
This thesis brings elements of strategies for complexity already learned and applied 
in the private sector to provide solutions to the DOD to address UUCCS. The following 
section depicts the DOD challenges for which such solutions are needed.  
C. HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL CONTEXT FOR THE DOD AND U.S. 
GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO CYBERSPACE 
There is a broad history of the DOD’s efforts to respond to change in cyberspace. 
While the government was an agent of change in cyberspace in its initial development 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, n.d.), in recent decades the private sector 
has led innovation and organizational approaches to cyberspace. Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
(1993) identify as early as Operation Desert Storm the unprepared nature of the government 
to operate in cyberspace, arguing for highly trained, focused, and flexible teams capable of 
blitzkrieg and phalanx level execution of operations. The implication is that these small 
teams would be capable of responding to change faster than a large, massed force, as the 
 
4 Further discussion on the differences in public and private sectors in Chapters II.A, II.B. 
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DOD tends to fund. Such recommendations on cyberspace strategy echoed by numerous 
other writers have been slow to be added to the DOD’s strategy. 
Additionally, some of those ideas may have been implemented, but research and 
development and use of the cyberspace domain had been previously classified by the U.S. 
Government, and so strategy and partnerships are largely out of the public eye. As the 
potential for military competition in cyberspace emerged, the United States perceived the 
need to institute an independent command responsible for cyberspace security, first setting 
up a sequence of joint task forces for network defense, then creating U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) as a branch of U.S. Strategic Command in 2010 nearly two decades 
after the issue was identified by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and finally elevating 
USCYBERCOM to an independent combatant command in 2018 (U.S. Cyber Command, 
2019). By this time, cyberspace expertise had already become highly technical and highly 
sought after, and industry was already hiring and maintaining talent that the DOD then had 
to compete for. As acknowledged in the current strategies, much of the technical expertise, 
cyberspace reach, and situational awareness is not held by the government, but by industry 
or the already established National Security Agency (NSA). The authorities to operate are 
separate for NSA and the DOD, which creates significant challenges when providing 
manpower to either group. It took five more years for the military to implement centralized 
cyber teams, for both defense and offense. Even more recently, for example, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral M. M. Gilday (2019), set strategy to increase small cyber teams 
as forces for fleet commanders. This is a quarter-century gap between academic proposal 
of Arquilla and Ronfeldt and the U.S. Navy—not even the broad DOD level—gaining 
enough momentum to implement their suggestions in the strategy.  
In a historic authority change, President Obama tasked the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) with overall engagement of the private sector in cyber defense. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOD, and law enforcement also operate in 
cyberspace, with the blurred international cyberspace boundaries complicating delineation 
of authority. Roles, responsibilities, and authorities for each entity is differentiated by law, 
8 
but requires laborious coordination due to cyberspace’s infrastructure.5 President Obama 
also focused on critical infrastructure, which has become fundamentally dependent on 
cyberspace and particularly vulnerable to unpredictable cyberspace change (White House, 
2016). The DOD has also begun to acknowledge the value of cyberspace, with the most 
recent National Defense Strategy (2018) finally adding cyberspace into its language as a 
key warfighting domain to master and achieve its mission; it had previously only been 
addressed as a generalized concept or in separate strategies, and therefore less likely to be 
included in strategies for other warfare domains. Declaring cyberspace a domain so 
important as to call it a warfare domain that requires investment of talent and resources 
also consequentially leads to increased attention, application, proliferation, and resources 
for cyberspace in other domains—a stronger adoption by the government.6 
While these changes broadened the base of governmental cybersecurity 
responsibility, the percentage of critical infrastructure owned by the private sector is 
estimated to be 90% (Gilliland, 2019), making the government’s reach limited to indirect 
action through laws, regulations, and partnerships rather than direct action and protection. 
As mentioned before, these conditions are complicated and challenging—a wicked 
problem—and efforts to address them have been slow to gain momentum and react to 
change. A more dynamic and responsive DOD strategy will recognize that the private 
sector is not only a source of lessons for strategizing the uncertainty of cyberspace, but also 
an active element of the problem set.  
 Cybersecurity Linkages of Private Sector and Government 
To operate in cyberspace and protect assets is costly to both the private and public 
sectors. In addition to cyberspace uncertainty in critical infrastructure, other issues with 
hacking, cybercrime, and state-sponsored theft highlight extreme cost to both sectors, 
which Norton (2018) estimates to be a $172 billion loss globally in 2017. The costs to 
defend cyberspace then further increase to prevent such losses, as quoted by Clinton 
 
5 Further discussed in Chapter I.C.a. 
6 Further discussed in Chapter IV.B.2. 
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(2015), who references $100 billion spent on cybersecurity alone in 2014. Cybersecurity 
measures do not necessarily factor into technology modernization or upgrade, which 
becomes a further cost of doing business. The numbers speak for themselves, where the 
inability to address the uncertainty of who, what, when, where and how in cyberspace 
strategy may cost organizations tremendously. 
Like costs, many of the tools and practices in cyberspace are similar for government 
and industry. For cybersecurity, both government and industry are protecting assets; 
adversaries can be state, non-state, or criminal actors, making cyber-attack attribution and 
tactics and procedures important for recovery or best protection practices. The refresh, 
modernization, and replacement product life cycle requirements are similar in both 
sectors.7 Critical infrastructure, while owned and operated by various private and public 
entities, is a significant governmental concern beyond the owners’ interests because the 
interconnected nature of cyberspace creates national security implications as 
vulnerabilities come into the spotlight. This interconnected nature increases the 
stakeholders for critical infrastructure, linking back to the wicked problem of cyberspace, 
while increasing the necessity for private and public sectors to contribute to strategy and 
partnership.  
 Cyberspace Strategy Is Different from Traditional Military Strategy 
These unique conditions of cyberspace mean that the requirements for DOD 
strategy are not the same as traditional military strategy, which challenges the DOD to 
learn how to address cyberspace in its strategy. To distinguish between cyberspace strategy 
and traditional military strategy, Kallberg and Cook (2017) highlight the following 
differences: cyberspace lacks object permanence, measurements of effectiveness in 
offensive cyberspace actions are inadequate or missing, decisions made at computational 
or machine speed decreases influence of strategic leadership, and cyberspace provides 
expansive capability for anonymous action. Similarly, Gartzke (2012) brings out a 
significant distinction between cyberwar and other military uses of force. He argues that 
 
7 Refer to this thesis’ definition of cyberspace in Chapter I.A. 
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cyber-attack would not be a cyber-Pearl Harbor, due to a general inability to cause durable 
harm on an adversary. He notes that a primary cyber action requires a backup of other 
modes of conflict to become effective to cause desired durable harm. He concludes that the 
internet becomes an “adjunct domain” to the traditional warfare domains. The differences 
in strategy mean that the DOD must learn new lessons on how to write effective cyberspace 
strategy and can take the opportunity to learn from the experience and expertise of industry 
partners who are also intrinsic elements of the domain. 
A particularly important unique condition of cyberspace is that the boundaries and 
infrastructure are not the same as geographic boundaries, which impacts the limitations of 
the government to act and operate. Aucsmith (2016), a cyberspace subject matter expert in 
both private and public sectors, scopes cyberspace as a global common, with boundaries 
defined by the communications infrastructure, rather than geographic lines. Every node in 
the infrastructure therefore could become a vector to communicate—or attack—anywhere 
else in the infrastructure due the design of built-in-connectivity. He argues that the U.S. 
Government is unable to be everywhere in cyberspace that requires protection, pointing to 
limitations in size, scope, complexity, technical capability, and legal authorities. This 
inability to protect all the dot-com domain, where most of the private sector operates, 
requires that the private sector protect itself, including investing resources, managing tools, 
and utilizing tactics to accomplish on their own. Self-protection naturally increases the 
scope of change, due to the numerous stakeholders acting within cyberspace, all competing 
for advantage and protecting assets. Due to the integrated nature of cyberspace discussed 
above, the ability of private actors to protect themselves is cumulatively (and sometimes 
individually) a major element of national security. Thus, if the U.S. Government is unable 
to protect the dot-com domain itself, its cyberspace strategy must aim to achieve that 
security through broader means.  
Shortcomings of U.S. Government cyberspace strategy in recognizing these unique 
qualities of non-geographic terrain and dynamic uncertainty are crucial to the direction of 
research for this thesis. Some of these shortcomings have been recognized. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2013) presented recommendations that 
“integrated national [cyberspace] strategy be developed that includes milestones and 
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performance measures; costs and resources; and a clear definition of roles and 
responsibilities” (p. 2). These elements are recommended to increase the effectiveness of 
the implementation and accountability; without these, the strategy becomes a limited tool 
to address the nation’s issues in cyberspace (p. 23). In a later report, the GAO found a gap 
in monitoring progress in cyberspace strategy implementation—a lack in feedback systems 
(2017). These findings are similar in an independent CNA report on the U.S. Marine Corp 
overall strategies, which cited a trend in strategies to be unspecific in prioritization, 
resource implication and leadership direction (Deal, 2013, p. 23). In response, the 
Cybersecurity National Action Plan (2016) took an initial, major step to codify efforts to 
dedicate additional attention, roles, manpower, training, and resources to cyberspace.  
Because the implementation of strategy is as important as its aspiration, these noted 
missing elements of measures of performance, milestones, costs, resources, and roles and 
responsibilities fundamentally inform the research for this thesis. The methodology 
provided in Chapter III adapts these specific elements to derive quantitative assessment of 
DOD and government cyberspace strategies, and for comparative evaluation of industry 
strategies to develop lessons learned. For the remainder of the thesis, measures of 
performance, measures of effectiveness and measures of success will all be grouped into 
the term “measures of success or measures of effectiveness” (MOS/MOE) for simplicity. 
Milestones will be referred to as “Timelines” to clarify and differentiate from the MOS, 
where other documents may use “milestone” to mean MOS.  
This introduction to UUCCS discusses cyberspace complexity to demonstrate a 
significant need for building a better and more robust strategy to address UUCCS. 
However, the government’s slow-moving nature and the complex nature of cyberspace 
makes this need a challenging wicked problem. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate 
in what ways industry’s experience may help the DOD and to address UUCCS, provided 
the government’s partnership is strong enough to take advantage of industry’s expertise. 
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D. THESIS ROADMAP 
This thesis compares key U.S. government and DOD cyberspace strategies to 
industry cyberspace strategies, focusing on whether those strategies address unpredictable 
and uncertain cyberspace change. This chapter has scoped cyberspace change to 
differentiate between anticipated, unpredictable, and uncertain cyberspace change, its 
complex nature as a wicked problem, and relevant historical context and criticism that 
contributes to the U.S. government and DOD’s approach to cyberspace.  
Chapter II demonstrates UUCCS has not been specifically researched as scoped. 
Instead, several fields of research contribute to understanding UUCCS: private and public 
sector similarities in cyberspace, how private sector strategy can contribute to public sector 
strategy, disruptive innovation and change management. Bringing these four fields of 
research together contextualizes UUCCS but does not answer this thesis’ research question. 
Chapter III outlines the methodology of this thesis using quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to evaluate key DOD and U.S. government strategies and a sampling of industry 
strategies.  
Chapter IV undertakes a background and framework analysis of the key DOD/U.S. 
government cyberspace strategies. Applying the quantitative and qualitative methodology, 
this chapter provides a detailed evaluation of how effectively these cyberspace strategies 
specifically anticipate change and implement that anticipation. On this basis, the chapter 
also establishes the foundation for comparison to industry strategies. These foundations 
highlight strengths and weaknesses of the key strategies as they relate to UUCCS.  
Chapter V compares the key DOD/U.S. government cyberspace strategies to the 
sampled private sector strategies and presents quantitative and qualitative findings. Key 
findings are that anticipation of unpredictable and uncertain change in DOD/U.S. 
government cyberspace strategies is surprisingly robust, but that private sector strategies, 
on average, include more strategic implementation elements than the DOD/U.S. 
government counterparts, such as measures of effectiveness, Feedback mechanisms, and 
Timelines. These findings inform this chapter’s development of a number of lessons 
learned applicable to improving DOD/U.S. Government cyberspace strategies.  
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Chapter VI draws overall conclusions from these findings and offers 
recommendations to the DOD for strategy changes. This chapter also points to areas for 
future research, including using a disruptive innovation theory model for strategic decision 
making and comparing the U.S. Government classified strategies to proprietary strategies 
unavailable for this thesis. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As discussed in Chapter I, the unpredictable and uncertain nature of cyberspace 
change is complex enough to be categorized as a wicked problem set. To draw lessons 
from private sector experience that can inform better DOD strategies to meet this wicked 
problem set, this thesis focuses on four core topics: private and public sector similarities 
and differences in cyberspace, private to public strategy translation, disruptive innovation 
theory, and change management. While the specific intersection of these four areas has 
little-to-no scholarly research, existing knowledge in each area contributes to 
understanding the entirety of the problem, and so cumulatively contribute to translating 
UUCCS from the private sector to the DOD.  
There are, of course, plenty of opinion editorials and papers by subject matter 
experts on the DOD’s efforts, some of which is utilized here to supplement the fields of 
research. But the focus is on what general knowledge in each of these four areas can 
contribute to the specific challenge this thesis addresses. Moreover, the specific 
contribution available from each core area is dependent on the predecessor to scope and 
validate its contribution to the research for this thesis. Hence, this chapter reviews 
sequentially the existing knowledge in these areas: private and public sector similarities 
and differences in cyberspace, private to public strategy translation, disruptive innovation 
theory, and change management. 
A. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
IN CYBERSPACE 
A baseline premise of this thesis is that public and private sector cyberspace is 
largely and fundamentally the same. Without this fundamental similarity, translation of 
strategies across sectors is a non-sequitur. But the environments obviously are not identical 
either. Hence, delineating both similarities and differences is important when considering 
any cyberspace interaction or cyberspace relationship between sectors.  
Existing literature addresses obvious similarities by inference, and two key 
similarities and one difference more significantly. The obvious similarities in cyberspace 
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between the private and public sectors are largely inferred in the literature: public and 
private sector have networks that utilize hardware, software, must store data, have 
interactions with internal and external users, communications, decisions, measurements, 
and computations. Innovations and new technologies are constantly being introduced and 
significantly changing the domain in speed or capability. Personnel and expertise must be 
trained, technology must be acquired, maintained, and replaced for any product. 
Adversaries of any kind can attempt to exploit vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized accesses 
or information, and this requires adherence to a defensive posture to prevent such 
exploitation.  
Beyond obvious similarities in private and public sector cyberspace, which 
contribute indirectly to UUCCS, there are two significant similarities and one major 
difference that are solid references for analysis in Chapter IV. 
1. Similar Use and Disparate Meaning in Agility Strategy 
Agility is a heavily used concept in both private and public sector strategies. 
Despite this usage in DOD strategy,8 agility does not exist in the DOD Dictionary as of 
January 2020 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020). Without a good definition, usage and 
communication is vulnerable to variability in interpretation and communication, which is 
easily demonstrated in the literature. The consensus in agility strategy is that an 
organization must be able to adapt to change to create or maintain its competitive edge. 
Horney et al. (2014), Worley et al. (2016), and Mireles et al. (2019) are good samples of 
the literature and use similar terms that communicate speed and adaptability. Adaptations 
discussed include personnel, process, and technology alignments, usually in a cycle. This 
cycle, variate in its details, is essentially to anticipate change, plan, initiate action, evaluate 
results. This is conceptually like Change Management processes.9 
Specific findings for each study provide further insights into agility strategy and 
how implementation is intimately connected. Horney et al. highlight creative and flexible 
 
8 Analysis for DOD agility is in Chapter IV.B.1.f. 
9 Further discussed in Chapter II.D. 
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processes that should enable rapid learning and unlearning. They emphasize unlearning 
unproductive processes, discovered through the Feedback and evaluation process, in order 
to achieve agility. The Feedback and evaluation are also designed to go beyond internal 
processes as a capability for the organization to respond to any changes and make fast 
decisions. Similarly, Worley et al. (2016) collate adaptability, resilience, leadership and 
change research to address agility, understood as “timely, effective and sustained changes 
that maintain superior performance” (p 77). A fundamental finding is the importance of 
matching a process cycle to the pace of environmental and industry change. They also note 
that some processes require flexibility, and others might require rigid sets of steps for 
appropriate management. 
Mireles et al. (2019) apply agility more specifically to cyberspace. At the level of 
practical application of agility strategy, they present quantitative metrics to evaluate both 
attackers and defenders’ effectiveness and how they adapt over time, which reflects 
cyberspace agility. They scope agility within an enterprise system (e.g., a network) as the 
ability to deal with changes as measured over time and effectiveness of response. They 
note that usually this is done using well-defined and accepted static metrics, which take a 
snapshot in time, but propose to use dynamic metrics instead. The framework considers 
the evolution of both attack and defense behaviors. They use a suite of metrics from 
multiple perspectives that are combined to show weighted averages, including specific 
time-linked metrics for attacker and defender, triggering time, evolutionary effectiveness, 
lagging time, relative and aggregated generational impacts. Also, they note that if they are 
to fully measure cyberspace agility, metrics need to measure ability to respond to new or 
zero-day attacks.  
While much of the agility application by Mireles et al. is similar in mindset to the 
general agility mindset of other authors, the literature demonstrates that the definition of 
agility is variable in different applications. 
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2. Similarities in Partnership Strategy 
Partnership is a foundational and consistent DOD, governmental,10 and industry 
cyberspace strategy, as demonstrated in the literature. Gillentine (2010) presents efforts in 
the previous decade, beginning with 2010, named Cyber 1.0 in the Space Symposium, 
which collected experts from leading organizations to collaboratively address issues in 
cyberspace. She observes that top organizations understand that they need the government 
to address vulnerabilities in cyberspace and need the government to take the lead. They 
want to work with the government to make cyberspace more secure, but the government in 
turn needs to listen to the industry leaders and make appropriate changes. Nearly a decade 
later, Johnson (2019) observes that industry still recognizes a relative incapability to deal 
with foreign governments and sophisticated hacking groups and must lean on the 
governmental expertise, intelligence, and authorities to combat these gaps in capability and 
capacity.  
While the need for partnership between the private and public sectors in cyberspace 
is clear, the meaning of partnership is not, and presents an opportunity for improvement in 
UUCCS. Specifically involved in government-to-industry partnerships, Clinton (2015) 
writes about a leading model in the formation of President Obama’s “Cyber Space Policy 
Review.” He notes that the concept of industry-government partnerships is ambiguous, and 
there is strain in the relationships. He pushes several best practices for operating these 
partnerships successfully, notably personal commitment from government and industry, 
transparency, broad stakeholder involvement, and utilized the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP), developed in 2006 as a foundation for further efforts. 
Simultaneously, he cites decreased trust and a lack of transparency and inclusiveness by 
the government, which erodes industry involvement. However, he concludes that the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework, launched by President 
Obama himself, became a fantastic and foundational success story, and firmly brought 
together government and industry to build an extensive set of cyberspace standards. 
 
10 Partnerships in the four DOD/government cyberspace strategies discussed in Chapter IV.B.1.d. 
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Establishing NIST standards was a foundational example where partnerships with 
government and industry worked well. Another good example is the Tallinn Manual series 
(2017), led by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Supported by 
legal and information technology experts, the Tallinn Manual addresses state 
responsibilities in terms of cyberspace and whether use of force criteria and the Law of 
Armed Conflict apply to states’ cyber operations. They analyze principles of general 
international law for jurisdiction, human rights law, air and space law, among others, 
determining that the more common cyber incidents observed by states on a day-to-day 
basis is not generally considered to be use of force or armed conflict. The reality is that 
each sector acts in the international arena, and the process of continual updated of these 
documents aims to promote strengthening international consensus on global norms and 
practices. Tallinn Manual outputs are thus important to later reference as a foundation 
setting and the process is an exemplar of successful work between the sectors. 
The main limitation of the prior research in this area is that it does not provide 
direction or clarify the ambiguity for the strategy to “strengthen partnerships,” as described 
in the DOD cyber strategies. The literature instead highlights the need for, and difficulty 
in implementation of, the strategy, particularly for UUCCS, largely due to its ambiguous 
nature. 
3. Key Difference: Legal Authority in Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
There are many differences in the private and public sector in general, and 
cyberspace is no different. For this thesis, however, the key difference is a legal one: The 
DOD is the sole authorized entity to act on behalf of the United States under the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC). As a legal concept, different actions in cyberspace are regularly 
debated between nation states as to whether they are categorized as acts of war, espionage, 
cybertheft, or use of force, to name a few issues. Hacking domestically is a form of fraud 
(Symantec Corporation, 2019), and unauthorized removal of information is characterized 
as theft (Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Criminal Division, 2015). State 
and federal laws limit the private sector so that, even if attacked, private actors cannot hack 
the attacker back, even to attempt to retrieve stolen property (National Conference of State 
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Legislatures, 2019; Maroney, 2017). Internationally, the private sector, and the rest of the 
non-DOD public sector, are not allowed to act on behalf of the U.S. nation using actions 
that could be considered a “use of force” outside the LOAC (First Research, 2017). Much 
of the discussion of cyber use of force and associated issues in cyberspace is discussed by 
the Tallinn Manual series (2017), but significant international consensus is regularly being 
addressed. The legal status differences between private and public sectors significantly 
change strategies that can be applied, where a private corporation would only have legal 
proceedings available to them, and the DOD might have LOAC authorization as a recourse 
for cyberspace issues rising to the level of national security concerns. These legal 
differences are a potential barrier to cross-sector strategy translation due to the clear 
authoritative boundary. 
Other differences of private and public cyberspace are discussed in the next section, 
as they do not directly relate to cyberspace, but to government and industry operations and 
management in general. These differences certainly affect cyberspace indirectly but are 
highlighted better by strategy translation. 
B. PRIVATE-TO-PUBLIC STRATEGY TRANSLATION AND 
ADAPTATION 
One of the core investigations of this thesis is how effectively private sector strategy 
can be used or adapted in the public sector, specifically the DOD, though the literature does 
not address UUCCS directly. Variation between public and private sectors makes strategy 
research a significant academic interest that has been pursued for decades.  
Perry and Rainey (1988), Van Der Wal et al. (2008), Alford and Greve (2017), 
Bryson and Roering (2007), discuss the similarities and differences between public and 
private organizations to assess the usefulness of the distinctions in organization theory. 
While a challenge, they agree that the private sector is the originator of many planning and 
strategic approaches that the public sector can benefit from. Perry and Rainey summarize 
private and public sector similarities in three dimensions: ownership, funding, and mode 
of social control. These dimensions exist in both sectors but are different in execution. 
Additionally, the sector similarities extend to function, such as supply, administration, 
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operations, etc., despite organizational differences. Key differences are that public sector 
is managed by processes, rules, directives issued by the government, and social and 
political exchanges are used to influence the government, stakeholders, and multi-
organizational processes, but private sector agents behave with the common purpose to 
engage in competitive market exchanges for goods and services.  
Consequentially, public sector strategy tends to have more intangible goals, less 
incentive for cost reduction, less information about and incentive from the economic 
market, and a complex internal bureaucracy as compared to private organizations. 
Additionally, public managers have less autonomy due to government authority restrictions 
and are subject to multiple external authorities. These studies indicate that market forces 
are not constraints but provide input and trends that lead the efforts of organizations. This 
input specifically is not as easily applicable in the public sector. 
The following discussion examines specific ways in which differences and 
variations function to complexify the government’s ability to address UUCCS and translate 
strategy from private to public sectors.  
1. Rate of Change Impacts Competitive Advantage and Implementation 
While the consensus of analysts of strategy translation between sectors leans toward 
the view that such translation is possible, the rate of change in the conditions organizations 
face presents challenges to strategy translation, which are particularly pertinent to 
cyberspace. Due to the high rate of change in the marketplace, Leavy (2014) argues that 
sustainable competitive advantage in the private sector, as a fundamental concept, is no 
longer relevant, and now organizations must “learn how to exploit short-lived opportunities 
with speed and decisiveness” (p. 3). He dubbed these opportunities as transient advantages, 
which require more adaptation and more innovation. The general premise is that in 
competition, advantages come and go fluidly, and therefore organizations cannot depend 
on maintaining that advantage without adapting to the next transient advantage.  
For UUCCS, the concept of transient advantage is particularly applicable. When 
conditions are changing rapidly, the next innovation might make previous efforts to 
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maintain any advantage, competitive or transient, less effective.11 Transient advantage 
strategies may change rapidly, and the time entailed in translating these strategies from 
private sector to public sector can leave the public sector constantly behind the changes in 
the evolving conditions. 
To address the rapidity of change, Poister (2010) suggests that organizations should 
shift thinking from episodic strategic planning to a broader process of strategic 
management on an ongoing basis. He observes that implementation and management of 
those same strategies must be better addressed and iterated, rather than looking toward 
newer strategies in a changing environment. Additionally, he discusses how public sector 
agencies regularly engage in annual strategic planning, not cyberspace specific in this case, 
but also observes that the extent to which an agency meets its own plan is rarely 
meaningful. He references U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports from 
2004 and 2005, citing inadequacy in creating outcome-oriented goals that connect long- 
and short-term efforts, inadequate stakeholder involvement, and identifying supporting 
resources. These same difficulties are still described in the 2013 GAO report,12 which 
depicts the opportunity for improvement that this thesis builds on for UUCCS. 
2. Private and Public Sector—Impact of Differences in Leadership 
Private and public sectors tend to desire certain values of leadership, which impacts 
the organizational strategy. Van Der Wal et al. (2008) determine several common values 
desired within leadership, including accountability, expertise, reliability, efficiency, 
effectiveness. They also make a case that certain values can be anticipated to be more 
valued in higher managers in one sector than in the other. The highest valued attributes in 
leaders in the public sector are accountability, lawfulness, incorruptibility, expertise, 
reliability, effectiveness, impartiality, and effectiveness. For private sector managers, the 
highest valued attributes are profitability, accountability, reliability, effectiveness, 
 
11 More detailed discussion on innovation and the effects on technology and transient advantage in 
Chapter II.C. 
12 Discussed in Chapter I.C.b. 
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expertise, efficiency, honesty, and innovativeness. While attributes like accountability and 
efficiency are highly valued in both sectors, divergence in such values as incorruptibility 
and profitability, for example, create differing sector environments as a natural result of 
differences in the leadership provided.13 Strategy reflects these differences in sector 
environments and values of the leadership, which makes the translation of strategies 
between sectors more challenging. 
With the variation in the sectors and differences in values of leadership, Alford and 
Greve (2017) describe each sector’s focus to create organizational value. Key in their 
conclusions is that public managers generally do not find perfect or optimal solutions but 
must “work with other stakeholders … in wider democratic processes to achieve forward 
momentum” (p. 13). Public managers should attempt to form and shape public value 
propositions, while engaging stakeholders and citizens. The public manager can create both 
private and public value, but the public value is consumed by citizens collectively in 
contrast to the individual focus of the private sector. This particular perspective supports 
the partnership strategy significantly because it involves stakeholders in building 
consensus to create the collective value desired, potentially more successfully than any 
single organization could achieve independently. So while the public sector value brings 
in multiple stakeholders for consensus, as is the goal in partnership strategy, the differences 
in the leadership and inherent sector value creation must be taken into account by 
leadership when translating or adapting strategy to that public sector challenge. 
3. Specific Model Contribution to Thesis 
With the general consensus that there are differences and challenges in translating 
or adapting private and public sector strategies, this thesis adapts previously developed 
models to translate UUCCS that appear most cognizant of those challenges. Bryson and 
Roering’s (2007) model echoes many recommendations in the GAO report (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2013),14 including clarification of roles and 
 
13 Further discussion on leadership in Chapter II.D.1. 
14 Previously discussed in Chapter I.C.b. 
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responsibilities, as well as basic strategy imperatives. The model’s process includes 
defining and clarification for:  
• consensus of support for successful plan formulation and 
implementation. 
• organization’s mission, values, and requirements validation. 
• strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis. 
• identification of strategic issues that will have long-term impact. 
• identification of practical alternatives for resolving the strategic issues. 
• the organization’s end-state, with actions and decisions for 
implementation and Feedback for evaluation. (Bryson & Roering, 2007, 
pp. 11–12)  
They use this framework to analyze six different private sector models for 
applicability and usefulness to the public sector and conclude that each model provides 
strengths and weaknesses inherent to the model itself. In the process of adoption or 
adaptation of any of the six models, they suggest that the public sector adjust the model to 
the specific situation. The adaptation per situation creates a modified or hybrid-type of 
strategy that uses appropriate and situation -specific elements to fit the organization. Based 
on this recommendation by Bryson and Roering, this thesis adapts their model’s elements 
for the qualitative analysis of the sampled strategies, developing a hybrid model that 
reflects SWOT analysis. 
The limitation of the strategy-translation literature is that there is no research 
directly contributing to adoption by the DOD of private sector UUCCS. The consensus is 
that the translation and adaptation of private sector strategy to public sector is possible, and 
so this thesis presents initial solutions to present recommendations and open the field to 
further research. 
C. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION THEORY 
Disruptive innovation theory is a sphere of research addressing the nature of 
unpredictable and uncertain technology innovation which acts as a model for unpredictable 
change, regularly applied to technology, and for this thesis, cyberspace. This is a key model 
that the private sector uses when approaching change in cyberspace. While it takes time to 
develop a new technology, whether it makes other technologies obsolete determines its 
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unpredictability. Much of the literature agrees that organizations that are not attentive to 
disruptive technologies when they position themselves to utilize or adapt to changes have 
a higher probability to fail. The limitation for this thesis, however, is that the theory 
addresses the change itself, offering a model to think about how changes occur, but does 
not provide strategy directly. The literature is also exclusively for the private sector, and 
thus this thesis bridges the gap to the DOD, unlocking modelling of disruptive innovation 
as a tool that has previously not been utilized in the literature for DOD strategizing. 
Disruptive innovation theory was introduced in 1996 by Christensen and Bower, 
which has spawned a tremendous amount of research and analysis, with articles numbering 
in the millions.15 Christensen’s later work, partnering with several other writers 
(Christensen & Bower, 1998; Christensen, Suarez, & Utterback, 1998; Christensen, Hang, 
Chai, & Subramanian, 2010; Christensen, Mcdonald, Altman, & Palmer, 2018), has been 
wildly influential. The theory describes the effect of a disruptive innovative technology on 
a performance scale over time and how it compares to sustaining technological 
improvements. In Figure 1, the model shows two trajectories. The top one is based on 
current technology that continues to be developed through sustaining and incremental 
technological improvements. The bottom trajectory is the introduction of the disruptive 
innovation technology. These are bisected by the dotted line, which indicates that the level 
at which the technology is available to consumers is at that dotted line. As time progresses, 
both technologies improve, but once the disruptive innovation technology is mature enough 
to merit mass use, there is better performance by the disruptive innovation than the 
sustained technology. Innovations can get better performance than old technologies over 
time, ultimately replacing the old technologies through multiple factors, which might 
include decreased manufacturing costs, higher market shares, capability, or capacity with 
which older technologies eventually could not compete.  
 
15 Much of the extensive literature on Disruptive Innovation Theory that is central to the field, on 
topics such as phasing, details, conflicts, caveats, and specific situations, does not directly address the focus 
of this thesis. Such works include Petrick and Martinelli (2012), Van Rensburg (2015), Walsh, Kirchhoff, 
and Newbert (2002), Yang, and Zhang (2013), Merali, Papadopoulos, and Nadkarni (2012), Aten and 
Thomas (2016), Zeng, Dong, Shi, and Li (2018). 
26 
 
Presented in a lecture at the 2001 Materials Research Society Fall Meeting 
Figure 1. Disruptive Technologies Model. Source: Christensen (2002). 
Many researchers have expanded on Christensen and Bower’s work. Rogers (2003) 
contributes work used by both disruptive innovation theory and change management by 
creating foundational work on diffusion of products in a market with a core concept known 
as the adopter curve, originally published in 1962. He describes a normal bell curve and 
the sequence of market segments that adopt a product: innovators, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and laggards. This model is later used to show further application 
in the disruptive innovation curve, discussed below in Figure 2. Originally meant to 
describe consumers of the innovative products, Bry (2018) adapts the model to describe 
learning-fast and scaling-up methodologies to create competitive advantage among 
producers. Nunes and Downes (2019) show that innovators invest significant time and 
resources yet struggle to develop or apply new technologies. They argue that late adopters, 
however, may produce an equivalent product more cheaply after the product has been fully 
developed, decreasing the innovator’s market share. Those late adopters benefit from the 
innovator’s work and can imitate development or application of the product after inevitable 
issues have been solved, utilizing their own resources to produce and distribute the product.  
Each addition demonstrates realities of unpredictability and uncertainty and suggest 
approaches that aid decision makers to lead their organizations through that change. As a 
key foundation for this thesis, such unpredictability may be in the form of technology 
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innovation, but also in processes and mentalities, which can follow the same patterns. It is 
a major concept whose application to government has not been given appropriate attention 
in the literature. 
1. Criticism of Disruptive Innovation Theory 
Critical literature shows that there is not a complete consensus on the theory, but 
also highlights that unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change is a complex issue—a 
wicked problem—and so a single model may not be complete or address all situations 
equally. As an example of the debate in the field, King and Baatartogtokh (2015) report 
that “[t]he theory’s essential validity and generalizability have seldom been tested in 
academic literature” (p. 77), despite significant influence in industry. Furthermore, they 
call into question whether the cases used by Christensen’s research fit the conditions and 
predictions well. Finally, they conclude that a theory can provide a model, but is no 
substitute for thoughtful analysis. 
Kane (2017) argues that the technology in and of itself is not the true key problem 
facing organizations. Rather, the problem for digital disruption is the “different rates at 
which people, organizations, and policy respond to technological advances” (para. 2). He 
references Deloitte’s 2017 Human Capital Trends study, concluding that “[t]echnology 
changes faster than individuals can adopt it, individuals adapt more quickly to that change 
than organizations can, and organizations adjust more quickly than legal and societal 
intuitions” (para. 2). This view reflects Rogers’ adoption curve, adapted to reflect 
communication application rather than product adoption. Kane’s work supports the overall 
disruptive innovation theory, while arguing that organizations should not be myopic in 
their focus of technology, and ensure the human factor be the primary focus.  
To prevent a sky-is-falling mentality, Sood and Tellis (2011) argue that the effects 
of disruptive innovation are generally exaggerated. Their study demonstrated that many 
disruptive technologies are not introduced in such a way as to cause industry disruption. 
Instead, only 16% of all technologies cause technology disruption. Additionally, 14% of 
all technologies cause firm disruption when the entrant innovation performs better than 
incumbent not in the primary dimension performance, but in a secondary dimension 
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performance. Their key findings are that potentially disruptive technologies “are not 
cheaper than established technologies,” “rarely disrupt firms,” and “are introduced as often 
by incumbents as by entrants” (p. 339). They do note that if a new technology can be 
produced at a low price, it increases the hazard of disruption, but this is generally not the 
case.  
Key to this thesis, if the unpredictable change follows the same percentages 
observed by Sood and Tellis, then risk to the incumbent, specifically the DOD and 
governmental cyberspace, is not absolute, and the risk can be managed without expectation 
of overnight, total fundamental change to the entire organization. 
2. Incumbents vs. Entrants 
A significant vein of disruptive innovation thinking within the private sector more 
specifically applies the theory to two different types of organizations: incumbents and 
entrants. Numerous works compare the disruptive innovation adoption curve used by the 
disruptive organization vs. the established enterprise. Nunes and Downes (2019) 
summarize a higher-level analysis on how easy it is for an innovator to enter a market 
segment, vs. the methodologies of decision-making used by an incumbent, creating 
significant advantage to the innovator, calling it a “Big-Bang.” This effect describes the 
compact nature of disruptive innovation market segments as compared to the normal 
market segments proposed by Rogers. Figure 2 shows the Big Bang model, with the 
adoption curve as the normal bell curve shape, as proposed by Rogers. The Big-Bang 




Accenture Analysis “Big Bang Disruption” published in 2013, referenced by Nunes and 
Downes (2019). 
Figure 2. Accenture Analysis “Big Bang Disruption.” Source: 
Nunes and Downes (2019). 
Nunes and Downes also offer the alternative that incumbents have some advantages 
over entrants, specifically in established knowledge and experience. However, the 
incumbent must rapidly respond to asset relevancy and changing value due to the 
innovator’s introduction of new technology.  
The adoption curve offers a model to determine the pace that the government and 
DOD adopt new technologies. This is a potential solution to a foundational challenge that 
this thesis seeks to address—how the government might deal with new innovations based 
on its placement in the curve and its ability to apply resources.16 
Woahika (2018) discusses the same big-bang phases as Nunes and Downes and 
adds detail to the concept, calling into question the smoothness of a curve in case of 
roadblocks to the diffusion of the technology. His observation is that there would be 
multiple small curves in the early phases of development, as trial users work out flaws. 
After this point the diffusion of the technology to everyone else causes the large big-bang 
curve. While Woahika demonstrates variation in a curve, Lee et al. (2013) discuss the 
different effects over time for early and late adopters according to the theory’s model. They 
 
16 Analyzed in Chapter IV.B.6.b. 
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highlight that the innovation effect is more pronounced within the innovator and opinion 
leader adopters, but the effect diminishes over time. Alternatively, the imitation effect is 
more pronounced within the early majority, late majority, and laggard adopters (p. 772). 
They demonstrate that the information and communication technology industries these 
effect patterns are especially impactful. They surmise that the product life cycle of a 
product shortens due to the capacity of other organizations to imitate the initial product.  
This is important in terms of DOD cyberspace competition. Initial stages of 
malicious innovations by an adversary might be observed by the U.S. Government and 
monitored for changes. The goal would be to either delay proliferation, or posture to adopt 
responsive technology in the majority that reflects the operational need. This may be earlier 
for competitive edge, or later for cheaper and faster adoption throughout the organization. 
Murphy (2011) uses Christensen’s model to point out that part of the dividing line 
between an innovator and the incumbent is the performance that a customer can use. If 
performance in a technology is not optimal, then a disruptive innovation allows for new 
competitors to gain market share more effectively by introducing their technologies to 
close the performance gap. However, if product improvement and sustaining innovations 
increase performance of the incumbent technology, over time the incumbent is the more 
capable of the two competitors, until such a time that the disruptive technology’s 
performance is cheaper and more effective. For UUCCS, every new technology may not 
address the performance requirements for the DOD and government and requires careful 
acquisition management to meet mission requirements. As a potential application, the 
model helps to determine replacement cycles, where technology should switch to the newer 
innovation, rather than depending on sustaining and improving existing products, which 
may not maintain competitive edge. 
To provide an organizational process to manage disruptive technology, Lindsay and 
Hopkins (2010) discuss an approach to innovation for incumbents, calling it a two pronged, 
offensive and defensive approach utilizing low-cost intellectual assets, e.g., small teams 
specifically designed to either defend against external competitive threats or offensively 
lay a foundation for future industry growth. They argue that both defending the current 
methodologies while preparing to integrate and incorporate the disruptive innovation offers 
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an alternative to a tendency of large organizations to attempt to ignore or crush disruptive 
innovations, which then does not adapt to the market reality of adopting that new 
technology. This approach is very similar to what has been put forth by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (1993), who in a military competition context advocate small and flexible teams 
to approach this problem, rather than a massive body of immovable strength. This work 
provides early recognition of the value of smaller units designed to respond effectively to 
unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change, offering a partial solution for process 
change within the DOD. 
In sum, the disruptive innovation model could be adapted in a novel way to apply 
to the DOD. In this application, the agents in the model would be nation-states instead of 
industry organizations, with the DOD considered as the incumbent in cyberspace, and the 
entrants as the adversaries who might present an unpredictable cyberspace change which 
diminishes the DOD’s competitive edge. Conversely, the theory demonstrates that the 
DOD might still be an incumbent but innovate to act on the entrant curve, as suggested by 
Sood and Tellis (2011), using the model as a strategy to continuously gain competitive 
edge and usurp adversary capability. 
Because disruptive innovation theory has not been applied to the public sector in 
cyberspace as a unified organizational model, the novel idea proposed above would require 
considerable development. This thesis will therefore contribute to the literature by 
analyzing innovation strategies that reflect disruptive innovation theory and proposing how 
its use by the DOD for risk management and prioritization may be possible.  
D. CHANGE MANAGEMENT (CM) 
Change Management (CM) is a foundational concept in the private sector and is a 
massive field of research. The management of the change itself is intimately integrated in 
standard industry practices and necessary to show how the private sector approaches 
change, both anticipated and unpredictable. CM describes a systematic approach for how 
an organization can deal with its leadership, people, customers, processes, and resources 
to effect change from a current state to a future state, internally and externally. In a sense 
this describes a culture change, where the organization holds its values and mission in such 
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a way as to respond to changes in a unified manner. The modernization and ubiquitous 
nature of cyberspace is emerging as a whole-of-organization issue, therefore having the 
entire organization united in a direction will make the organization postured better to 
address changes and threats. CM is the largest field of research applied to this thesis, due 
to its broad application to change and specific application to cyberspace change.17  
While many organizations through history have managed change, the concept as 
such was formulated in early 1900, with the 1970s increasing the number of authoritative 
writers. As cited by Prosci (n.d.), Beckerd writes in 1969 about developing organization 
discipline using organization-wide planning and top-down management. The goal is to 
increase effectiveness using processes that are planned to use behavioral-science tools. 
Kotter (1978; 1979; 1988; 1999), is a major source of organizational change methodology; 
several books from the late 1970s to the early 2000s focus on organizational behavior, 
leadership, and management power. He makes the case from experience and observation 
that leadership is different than management, and power and the ability of managers and 
leaders to influence others is what makes the difference in effectiveness of an organization 
to make meaningful and profitable change. This section explains CM in general, then 
highlights several key areas of research that more specifically apply to UUCCS. 
As the concept of CM has taken hold, many aspects have been researched and 
turned into processes to become the foundation of industry thinking. Appelbaum et al. 
(2012) provide a broad description of CM, analyzing the change model from 1996 to 2011 
by revisiting the change management model proposed by Kotter and its relevance after 
fifteen years. They determine that though Kotter wrote for readability and practicality, the 
models did not include formal studies to support scientific consensus. That being the case, 
they conclude that Kotter’s change management model is still valid, and their studies 
support the Kotter principles more empirically. Other experts in the field contribute their 
 
17 There is a myriad of CM strategies available in the literature, which do not directly address the 
UUCCS focus of this thesis. They address aspects of CM, including phasing, details, conflicts, caveats, and 
specific situations, and deeper diving and combination of these strategies might be an area for future 
research. See, representatively, Liedtka and Rosenblum (1996), Liedtka and Kaplan (2019), Mayer and 
Vambery (2008), McMillan and Overall (2016). 
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specific recommendations, such as Kittinger et al. (1997) empirically discussing Business 
Process Change Methods, Techniques and Tools utilized in their consulting services. 
An organization’s approach to CM includes multiple elements or factors that direct 
its methodology. Tamilarasu (2012) discusses organizational change generally and 
highlighted three major aspects: adapting to change, controlling change and effecting 
change. His work collates much CM work to highlight principles for CM, processes, scope 
of change, why people resist change, and then looks at techniques for leadership to 
facilitate implementation. Similarly, Edmonds (2011) and Giniat et al. (2012) focus on how 
communication, education, and training can be used to decrease the fear of unknowns for 
employees, customers, and stakeholders by setting goals, objectives and budgets, by then 
involving, engaging, and educating the entire workforce of the organization, and by 
incorporating Feedback in response to changes. These authors also address factors that 
decrease success in CM, which include: general resistance to change, limitations of existing 
systems, lack of executive commitment or champions, unrealistic expectations, lack of 
cross-functional teams, inadequate team and user skills, and technology user un-
involvement.  
For the private sector, using these concepts to guide organizations through change 
provides them a competitive edge. Bureaucratic and diverse governmental institutions 
struggle to apply this lesson quickly yet can over time. However, ability to adapt with speed 
is central to qualifying CM, converging with the quality of agility already discussed.18 
Agility is a central method of thinking in CM; each change is also subject to time. Decisions 
and changes must be timely to be effective, and sustained to maintain superior 
performance, and thus competitive advantage (Worley et al., 2016). This thesis investigates 
whether and how internalizing CM as a culture mindset, from leadership to subordinates 
to partners and allies, would help the government adapt to change, and specifically help it 
address UUCCS more effectively. 
The following sections are central to CM and provide a lens for qualitative analysis 
on the sampled government and industry strategies. Each section below highlights elements 
 
18 Previously discussed in Chapter II.A.1. 
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within the general literature that drive success in CM, and which the thesis applies to 
analyze how well individual strategies address UUCCS. 
1. Leadership 
Much research is focused on individual elements of CM, to which leadership is 
central. The general consensus is that even the best planning, the best organizations, can 
become ineffective without proper leadership. Also central to leadership in CM is that the 
leader is the one who navigates through change, particularly unpredictability, and brings 
along the organization. Therefore, considering the centrality of unpredictable change in 
cyberspace, leadership must be dominant in the field of view.  
The high impact and effect of leadership on CM has long been recognized by Kotter 
and other leaders in this field. Aiming toward governmental CM, McFarland (2015) 
specifically addresses governmental leaders who are required to do more with less, and 
faster than anyone else. His short paper applies a few leading concepts by other authors but 
highlights several issues within federal government that slow positive change, such as 
mission creep and scarce resources, and some capacities that require bolstering, such as 
human capital, leadership, infrastructure, and motivating employees to change. All these 
issues are dependent on the capability of the leader to bring about change, and the public 
sector requires leaders who can manage the incredibly large, dynamic, and complex 
governmental realities. He argues that it is not good enough to merely manage change, but 
the leaders must use change to fuel performance improvement. 
Leadership recruitment is a sub-topic highly relevant to UUCCS. Bunker et al. 
(2012) contend that status-quo, tried-and-true methodologies can cause difficulties for 
organizations when the environment changes quickly. They argue that the model for 
developing leaders who are capable of navigating volatile, uncertain, complex, and 
ambiguous situations is to first recruit talent for intelligence, technical skill, and high 
motivation, then teach relational and leadership skills. The key factor is to teach self-
directed, experiential learning to decrease lead times and costs (p. 288). Similarly, 
Hechanova et al. (2018) discuss specific leadership competencies and their effect on CM 
in both industry and academic situations. They find that CM is more influenced by 
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execution competencies within industry leadership, and strategic and social competencies 
in academic leadership (p. 914). This observation converges with previously discussed 
work indicating that different leadership traits are valued in different sectors and have 
different impacts on their organizations.19 Therefore, methodology that guides recruitment 
of leaders and talent is highly relevant to UUCCS and analyzed in Chapter III. 
2. Strategic Communication 
Strategic Communication is a core foundation of CM, required for any organization 
that desires to take charge and provide direction for change. Literature consensus is clear 
that strategy does not produce results by being written down and taped to the CEO’s door—
strategic effectiveness requires organizational direction, application, comprehension, 
support, and adherence at all levels, from board members to the newest employee. Strategic 
communication means conveying organizational direction through constant, consistent, 
and methodical communication, both top-down for unifying direction and bottom-up for 
effectiveness Feedback. Alternatively, if communication is not consistently applied in both 
directions, chance of strategy failure is increased, or effects of the strategy decreased.  
Elaborating this overall observation, Rogers highlights the differences between 
mass communication and interpersonal communication and how leaders use both to affect 
change in their organizations. Similarly, Giniat et al. argue that leadership must engage the 
workforce, as well as a stakeholder base, to address real issues, lead in mindsets, identify 
benefits and sustainable performances, and ensure the vision of change is carried out at a 
personal level (Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976; Rogers, 1999; Rogers, 2002; Giniat et 
al., 2012). As cyberspace has evolved and made information easily available, keeping 
stakeholders organized under the strategy through strategic communication is a key to 
success, a key to culture change, and a key to implementation. Analysis of the DOD 
strategies in Chapter III will show how the DOD uses strategy as its strategic 
communication, how it filters down, and how that communication causes challenges in the 
organizational unity of effort for cyberspace. 
 
19 See Chapter II.B.2. 
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3. Agents of Change vs. Reactors to Change 
Proactive and reactive approaches to change link Disruptive Innovation Theory and 
CM. Anticipated change is much less likely to cause problems for an organization because 
the organization can adapt proactively to meet the change through careful strategy. Yet, as 
discussed in the Disruptive Innovation Theory section, unpredictable or uncertain change 
can be devastating to any organization. Work on this topic identifies two categories: either 
the organization is the agent of change, e.g., the cause of the change, or the organization is 
a reactor to change, either proactively or reactively (Rogers, 2003; Nunes & Downes, 2019; 
Sood & Tellis, 2011; Lindsay & Hopkins, 2010). These key distinctions are observable in 
industry as leader organizations or follower organizations. The differentiation of agent and 
reactor may shift over time, however; an organization may react to a situation, and then be 
opportunistic and establish itself as an agent of change as the situation evolves. 
Alternatively, proactively posturing the organization for change allows for advantageous 
reaction as events occur. This is a spectrum of distinction, but significant in later analysis, 
which will rely on these distinctions heavily. 
To provide opportunistic guidance on how to be an agent of change, Wiltbank et 
al. (2006) discuss the important independence of prediction and control. They imply that 
control-oriented approaches that are non-predictive may be successful. They emphasize 
asking the questions of “what next,” as well as the analyzing costs and risks of strategies 
and efforts to innovate. Rather than simply responding to changes in market/audience 
trends, they propose utilizing stakeholder networks and creativity to enter new markets and 
out-of-normal operations that expand the organization’s competitive edge. This means that 
instead of protecting against contingencies, an organization can seek to capitalize on the 
opportunities presented by such events. Furthermore, they recommend an evaluation of 
such events in terms of acceptable loss, rather than expected return. They take a view that 
instead of goal oriented strategies, which ask, “what resources, tools and tasks are needed 
to get to the goal,” organizations should ask questions based on organizational identity, 
resources, talent and networks that push in a direction that logically arrive at an action. 
This focuses on the already current strengths of the organization, rather than requirements 
to implement new change. While this approach is effectively a nuanced risk assessment, it 
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highlights a mentality that is aggressive in pursuing competitive edge in response to 
unpredictable and uncertain change. 
E. INTERSECTION OF RESEARCH 
Each of these major areas of research discussed in this chapter contributes its 
approaches to the question of UUCCS individually but incompletely. At the intersection, 
however, conclusions can be collated and inferred. From Change Management, Leadership 
that is strong enough to lead through uncertainty and strategically communicates well 
contributes to the intersection. Also, agility strategies, both in decision making mindsets 
and cyberspace speed and reaction time, are significant contributors. Disruptive Innovation 
Theory demonstrates that “business as usual” can lead to the usurping of an incumbent. 
The research implies that not all innovations impact entire fundamental systems, however, 
decreasing immediate and catastrophic likelihood for any innovation. Also, innovations 
can be observed by competitors and incumbents in use at the innovation and early adopter 
phases before proliferation. The early observation allows some lead time for the incumbent 
to determine a response, either as an early majority, late majority, or laggard adopter, or by 
mitigation of current processes. 
Fundamental similarities in cyberspace between the private and public sectors also 
indicate that strategy should be convergent in both environments. There may be differences 
in processes - government expresses consensus-based, multiple variate stakeholder 
processes vs. market-driven private sector entities that express more unity-of-purpose 
processes—that make strategy translation and implementation between these environments 
a challenge. Yet, increased partnership between the private and public sectors has been 
occurring, such as the establishment of the NIST and Tallinn 2.0 manual, which facilitates 
translation of strategic thinking between the communities. This engagement is also 
leadership dependent, where different traits are expected of leaders in each sector, but 
collaboration and partnerships are highly dependent on that leadership to hold together. 
Key to each section are several consistencies. Strategic communication to 
employees, stakeholders and clients is vital to keep the organization on track, and 
organizations without such communication face increased likelihood of failed 
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implementation. Also, strategy should have goals which are implemented properly and are 
measurable, with some metric of success, all of which should be communicated out. This 
is applicable across all strategy but becomes even more imperative to apply to the wicked 
problem of unpredictable cyberspace change.  
Additionally, the concept of small units capable of quick thinking and action, such 
as suggested by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993), is mentioned or implied in many previous 
works as a viable method of approaching a problem quickly, then applying significant 
changes to a greater organization after initially managed by the smaller unit. Also, 
determining which processes, products, and people require change is important throughout 
each section; some processes require more flexibility, and some require strict adherence to 
rules. This requires revisiting these implementations of strategy in an iterative Feedback 
process, instead of attempting to start from the beginning each time. 
No single work has put all this research together to analyze both government and 
private sector strategies that use these areas of research and evaluate for application, 
adaption, or adoption across sectors. Collation of the research is therefore necessary and 
sets the stage for generally answering the UUCCS question. The following chapter 
provides this collation in the context of framing the methodology of its application to the 
challenge of effectively strategizing for change in key U.S. Government agencies 
responsible for national cyberspace security.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The core question of this thesis, discussed in Chapter I, is how the U.S. Government 
can draw lessons from private sector entities to improve its anticipation of unforeseeable 
developments in military cyberspace, and generate an Unpredictable and Uncertain 
Cyberspace Change Strategy (UUCCS) for this purpose. Chapter II presented the core 
existing bodies of knowledge from which this thesis draws to address that question. 
Chapter III outlines the methodology for this analysis, incorporating two frameworks 
introduced in Chapter II. Subsequently, Chapter IV applies this framework of analysis to 
the DOD/government strategies as a baseline analysis.  
A. FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTION 
Chapter III provides definitions, methodology, purpose, and reasoning to describe 
each researched data element. The quantitative framework is based on a CNA report by 
Deal (2013), which researched five U.S. Marine Corp strategies and categorized each with 
four general and overarching elements of strategy: “Diagnosis (Future threats & 
challenges), Guiding policy (Approach and priorities), Coherent actions (Coordinated & 
linked objectives), and Assessment Extend meets all elements” (p. 22). These are simply 
given a “yes,” “no,” or “some” value as assessment. This thesis takes this model and dives 
deeper to evaluate how much a strategy might be considered a “yes” or “some.” Additional 
categories are based on the GAO report on U.S. cybersecurity strategy (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2013), which highlighted MOS/MOE, milestones, 
Feedback mechanisms, and resource allocation as requiring increased attention. Additional 
categories are added for clarity and to address UUCCS. This is further described in the 
Quantitative Methodology section of this chapter below. 
The qualitative framework is loosely based on the work by Bryson and Roering 
(2007), which utilized SWOT analysis of strategies, primarily focusing on the strengths 
and weaknesses of the strategy. Deal (2013) also had short summaries of the documents 
assessed, pointing out trends, strengths, and weaknesses. In this thesis, trends are collated, 
and differences highlighted to draw out best practices and efforts. The DOD/government 
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strategies are assessed more thoroughly to describe strategies and trends that may already 
address UUCCS or highlight potential gaps. The industry strategies are collated as trends 
and summarized to only focus on those strategies that address UUCCS. In-depth strength-
and-weakness discussion for entire strategies is not included here unless it better described 
how that organization addressed UUCCS. This is to scope analysis to only UUCCS 
relevant information. This is further described in the Qualitative Methodology section of 
this chapter below. 
B. SOURCE DATA 
The four key strategies analyzed are the National Defense Strategy 2018 (NDS), 
National Cyber Strategy 2018 (NCS) introduced by the White House, the DOD Cyber 
Strategy, and the USCYBERCOM Command Vision (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018a; The White House, 2018; United States Department of Defense, 2018a; 
U.S. Cyber Command, 2018). These are chosen due to the hierarchical nature and 
collective cyberspace focus. Rather than taking a single strategy, analyzing across multiple 
strategies provides greater insight into the effort by the DOD and U.S. Government to 
address the myriad of issues and challenges in cyberspace and how various levels interact 
and align with the others. 
The thesis also analyzed strategies of 22 private sector entities, listed in the source 
reference list in the Appendix A. Although the four DOD/governmental strategies are 
readily provided through governmental websites, industry strategies are not readily 
available. Thesis research obtained these strategies through variate methods, including the 
organizations’ SEC filings Form 10-K, organization website, and published investor annual 
reports. Attempts to obtain strategic documents via personal contact was attempted at the 
RSA 2020 conference and a Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 
conference, meeting, and networking with subject matter experts. None of the 
organizations provided their proprietary organizational strategy at the RSA 2020 
conference, though many made recommendations and pointed to their public documents 
already mentioned. The data is therefore derived from what is publicly available, and 
generally focused on language indicating that the information is at least part of the 
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organization’s strategy, i.e., “Our Strategy,” or may have been a published product 
approach strategy for solving problems. The variate source data may account for variation 
in results. The validity of the data is assumed in that outliers are accounted for in the 
averages and ratio process. Additionally, business practices and product goals are assumed 
to be the results of the organization’s strategy, and so are valid to represent the strategy, 
even if not labelled as such. Of note, Splunk is the only organization which had two 
separate groupings of strategy on its website and SEC filing Form 10-K, which is combined 
to provide the more comprehensive strategy of the organization. 
The case studies are cross-sectional sample of industry organizations, including 
Fortune 500 cybersecurity organizations, technology organizations, non-cybersecurity 
technology organizations, and smaller organizations that may contribute diverse lessons 
for UUCCS planning. Private sector strategies are not always directly comparable to U.S. 
Government documentation, and none are official cyberspace strategies, though the 
organization may have been built entirely around cyberspace technology. Some strategies 
may be simpler, yet potentially more succinct, concise, or precise. Some corporate 
strategies are not written as an explicit strategic document and must be inferred through a 
website or other documentation. Collation of the quantitative data tries to manage this 
comparability challenge.  
Some of the data is difficult to abstract to the categories analyzed. For example, 
strategies discussing current products did not necessarily reflect a future change and 
demonstrated an ongoing production. These would not be included as in the Timelines 
category unless specifically provided with a term like, “daily,” or “24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week.” While the strategy assumes that the discussed products would be utilized daily, 
only specified language is included in the tally. Other examples include counting “making 
investments” as contributing a specific budget, or “customer service” specifically 
mentioned to handle Feedback issues. To be consistent, the MOS/MOE of strategies are 
not counted if achievement of the strategy is assumed but might have been counted if there 
is qualifying language, such as “effective.” This is an attempt to follow the explicitly 
addressed strategy, even when it is obvious that the attainment of the strategy is its own 
MOS/MOE. This limitation is particularly obvious in the DOD/government strategies, 
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where the goal is clearly to perform the strategy, but not specified that the achievement is 
the MOS/MOE. 
C. QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Quantitative analysis assesses the specific sections of strategic documents by 
measuring two variables: how much the strategic section addresses unpredictable or 
uncertain change, and the presence or absence of other elements related to implementation 
of strategy. Each document is broken up into its component sections, usually a paragraph 
under a title heading. For this thesis, these component sections are called, “strategic 
sections.” The first variable of unpredictable change is designed to assess how strongly the 
organization focused on being an agent of change—how big of a goal or lofty the aspiration 
of the organization. The second variable that measured the presence or absence of other 
elements of strategy informed how well the strategic section addressed the first variable’s 
claims to address change. The full data spreadsheets are in Appendix B. 
The first variable is a measure of “unpredictable change,” which codes how the 
strategic section addresses unpredictable or uncertain change on a scale of 0–5. This may 
or may not be cyberspace specific. The higher the number, the more the strategic section 
is assessed to address unpredictable or uncertain change. Strategic sections assessed to be 
a 3 or higher on the scale are considered more valuable to this thesis’ considerations for 
lessons learned. The scale is as follows:  
• 0 does not address change at all.  
• 1 acknowledges potential for change.  
• 2 is a response to some change that already occurred in time, i.e., 
modernization.  
• 3 is a posture for anticipated change, with a single specific or vague 
uncertainty limited to a single or simple general concept.  
• 4 is a greater posture for anticipated change, with broader general 
uncertainty that may include second- and third- order effects.  
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• 5 is an aim to act proactively to shape future conditions ahead of the 
unpredictability, therefore decreasing its unpredictability and uncertainty 
for the organization itself, and potentially causing it for others. 
Many industry products are custom built but may or may not have been counted as 
a “5” on the unpredictable change scale depending on whether the language includes 
something like, “proprietary,” “innovative,” “cutting edge,” or “proactive.” Some of these 
could be assumed based on common business practices but are not counted because they 
are not specified in the strategy. 
The second variable is the presence or absence of the other elements of strategy, 
which are based on the GAO (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013) 
report. The report recommended inclusion of more measures of success, milestones, 
Feedback mechanisms and resources dedicated. These recommendations, as the report 
suggests, would improve overall cyberspace strategy. This improvement of overall 
cyberspace strategy would therefore increase and address effectiveness of UUCCS. The 
five categories tallied for each strategic section are: Action Items, Measures of Success or 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOS/MOE), Timelines, Feedback, Budget Allocated. These 
are defined and explained below. For each strategic section, these are counted and tallied 
and entered into a spreadsheet. These elements are multiplied by 0.01 for a computed 
number at the end of each strategic section as a coded number to show the total for that 
strategic section in the following equation: 
Unpredictable Change value + (total number of tallies for the strategic section * 0.01) = 
coded number, 1 of <total number of strategic sections in the document> 
This coded number provided an “at a glance” assessment of the strategic section, 
where higher number addresses UUCCS better than the lower number. This computed 
coded number is the “Total” column. 
Averages for the different elements are taken to provide the overall measure across 
the document. Combined Averages take the computed averages per document and averages 
them together to compare all the industry strategies against the DOD/government 
strategies. 
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Ratios are taken to reduce the variability between documents further, utilizing 
percentages to compare between detailed strategies and concise strategies. Combined 
Ratios take the computed ratios and averages them together to compare all the industry 
strategies against the DOD/government strategies. 
“Action Items” are defined as a statement that declared an effort that “shall” be 
performed or promises to accomplish a task, all to achieve that strategic section’s overall 
goal. These are present in every section of every strategy. The number of Action Items 
varied from document to document, where some are more simple or concise, and others 
are packed full of direction and action points. Action item tallies are averaged per document 
to account for variability within the document. The document averages are then again 
averaged into the “Combined Average Action Items Per Strategy.” This average 
represented the average action item tallies across all documents. In general, the higher the 
tally of Action Items per strategic section, the more the section is directive and specific. 
“Measures of Success or Measures of Effectiveness (MOS/MOE)” are an indicator 
that demonstrates that the strategy and/or the Action Items within the strategic section had 
been accomplished beyond a simple execution of the strategy, e.g., “success looks like 
_________.” These are tallied per strategic section. The tally would only increase if the 
strategy specifically mentioned the MOS/MOE, rather than implying that the MOS/MOE 
is for the strategy to be completed. Some MOS/MOE are the same as the Action Items, 
depending on phrasing. For example, Action Items might do X, Y, Z in order to do P, D, 
Q, and all 6 would be counted as separate Action Items, but only P, D, and Q would be 
MOS/MOE. This is because P, D, and Q would have to be accomplished for the Action 
Items to be completed. If the phrasing “enables the customer to do A, B, and C,” these are 
counted as an MOS/MOE, but not an action item because the organization is not doing the 
action. MOS/MOE tallies are averaged per document to account for variability within the 
document. The document averages are then again averaged into the “Combined Average 
MOS/MOE Per Strategy.” This average represented the average MOS/MOE tallies across 
all documents. In general, the higher the tally of MOS/MOE per strategic section, the more 
descriptive and meaningful the Action Items became. 
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While the GAO report used the term “milestones,” this thesis uses “Timelines” to 
differentiate and prevent confusion for the language that other documents may use to 
indicate that a milestone is a definition for a MOS/MOE. The definition for “Timelines” is 
necessarily broadly applied, because most strategies will not tie themselves to minutes or 
years, but use terms like, “rapid,” “timely,” or “efficiently.” These vague terms are 
included to acknowledge that there is some measure of time involved but would likely be 
defined at a lower level or could be situational. There are occasional Timelines, usually 
annual, which demonstrated some level of the organization’s strategic cycle. Timeline 
tallies are averaged per document to account for variability within the document. The 
document averages are then again averaged into the “Combined Average Timelines Per 
Strategy.” This average represented the average Timeline tallies across all documents. In 
general, the higher the tally of Timelines per strategic section, the more descriptive and 
meaningful the Action Items became. 
“Feedback” included any specified situation or method where the strategy is 
readdressed for adjustments, another broad category. These included internal Feedback 
between departments, market Feedback, customer Feedback, or customer service, to name 
a few. Accountability is also included in this category, which is highly pertinent to the 
government. Feedback tallies are averaged per document to account for variability within 
the document. The document averages are then again averaged into the “Combined 
Average Feedback Per Strategy.” This average represented the average Feedback tallies 
across all documents. In general, the higher the tally of Feedback per strategic section, the 
more descriptive and meaningful the Action Items became. 
The definition for “Budget Allocated” is any acknowledgement of resource 
allocation, either by mentioning a specific number of dollars, an annual budget specified, 
or even broad terms indicating “prioritization” of resources to the strategy. The scope of 
these categories is broad to cover artful sentence structures designed for readability and 
variation in responsible organization. Depending on the source data, this might be reflected 
more strongly, such as an annual report to investors, who are highly interested in annual 
returns and budgetary management. 
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Additional information is analyzed across the entire document, both for 
computational analysis and to compare strategies at a deeper level. These included the 
average empty elements, ratio of cyberspace specific strategies, and then ratios to 
normalize between strategies. The ratios help compare internal consistencies, where the 
organization may have a high or low number of Action Items, but using the ratio makes 
the strategy more comparable to the ratio/percentage of other organizations. 
“Average Empty Elements Per Strategy” took an average of every “0” count in the 
Action Items, MOS/MOE, Timelines, Feedback, and Budget Allocated across the whole 
document. This measure is used to reflect how thorough the organization designed its 
strategy. The smaller the number, the fewer elements are ignored, which is better. The 
assumption is that having something tallied makes the strategy stronger and is better than 
nothing. 
The “Cyberspace Specific Ratio” is designed to indicate how many of the strategic 
sections are related to cyberspace. For every strategic section, it is marked as a “1” for 
cyberspace specific, and a “-1” for non-cyberspace specific. The non-cyberspace specific 
strategies tended to be legal or financial focused. The ratio is the number of cyberspace-
specific strategic sections divided by the total number of strategic sections. The purpose is 
to act as a corrective variable to determine whether organizations that are not cyberspace 
focused, e.g., had a low cyberspace ratio, had some lessons that might apply to UUCCS. 
The other ratios are computed by taking the MOS/MOE, Timelines, Feedback, and 
Budget Allocated averages for the strategy and dividing by the Action Items. After 
computing per strategy, the average is taken for all documents to create a Combined MOS/
MOE, Timelines, Feedback, or Budget Allocated over Action Items value. This ratio is to 
account for style within each strategy, so that regardless of length or number of tallies, the 
ratio of implementational features to action items would be more comparable between 
strategic documents. 
The total number of documents and strategies analyzed is 26, including the DOD/
government strategies. The total number of computed and tallied data elements, which 
included total strategic elements multiplied by the number of strategic sections, including 
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the empty elements, all averages, and ratios, is 4,340 data elements. The total number of 
tallied items (the number of Action Items + number of MOS/MOE + number of Timelines 
+ number of Feedback + number of budget) plus the computed cells is 12,113 individual 
data points that contributed to the data elements. 
D. QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The qualitative analysis is aimed at evaluating the more interpretative and 
idiosyncratic qualities of specific strategic sections that address UUCCS. The framework, 
based on Bryson and Roering (2007) and Deal (2013) as described at the beginning of this 
chapter, lends the model for analysis. The literature review also provides general categories 
to highlight, such as partnerships, agility, leadership, disruptive innovation, or change 
management designed to address UUCCS. Each document is analyzed for those general 
categories, and trends are collated. 
The qualitative analysis of DOD/government strategies includes a section on the 
common themes that address UUCCS across the strategies. The analysis then develops 
individual strategy sections that highlight specific concepts or elements in each strategy 
that are stronger than or diverge from the other strategies. This analysis also includes 
identification of some weaknesses and gaps that do not address UUCCS. The in-depth 
analysis for the DOD/government strategies is to establish the baseline for comparison, 
determining what strategies address UUCCS well, and what might be missing or less 
effective in the future. 
The qualitative analysis for the industry strategies are not presented as deeply per 
strategy; rather, the analysis provides only those trends and specific strengths that 
contribute lessons learned for UUCCS. This is done in a less in-depth manner to avoid 
confusing the results and scope for those strategies which only address UUCCS. Results 
of the collated trends are reported with a description of the strategy and the organizations 
that mention, utilize, highlight, or develop those strategies.  
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E. SUB-QUESTION ANALYSIS 
Sub-questions are additionally applied to the analysis for clarity. The quantitative 
and qualitative analysis sections present the current strategies that address UUCCS, which 
leads to the natural question: Will these strategies be effective in the future? Here the 
analysis draws on the literature for anticipated effectiveness and combines the quantitative 
and qualitative information for more detailed analysis. Additionally, answering the second 
sub-question -- Can the DOD improve on strategies already in existence? -- leads to the 
further research into the industry strategies. This section includes observations of the 
strategies considering the key elements in the literature reviewed in Chapter II. Mapping 
the criteria through these two questions establishes the baseline of current U.S. cyberspace 
policy for comparison to the industry sampling data in Chapter V. 
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IV. BASELINE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DOD/GOVERNMENT 
STRATEGY 
This chapter develops the foundation to evaluate the question of UUCCS by 
undertaking a baseline analysis of current DOD/government cyberspace strategy. Chapter 
III presented the methodology and framework which is applied to the DOD/government 
strategies and industry case studies. This chapter presents results of analysis of the four 
DOD/government strategies: The National Defense Strategy 2018 (NDS), National Cyber 
Strategy 2018 (NCS), the DOD Cyber Strategy (DCS), and the USCYBERCOM 
Command Vision (CCV). Quantitative results are followed by the qualitative, after which 
additional sub-questions are addressed for more in-depth analysis. Chapter V presents the 
findings for industry strategy and compares the information to the DOD/government 
results. 
A. EXPLANATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
The quantitative results for the DOD/government strategies presents the baseline 
for comparison to the industry strategies in Chapter V. The core quantitative finding is the 
Unpredictable Change evaluation for the four DOD/government strategies. Every strategy 
was measured for how well it addresses change, on a scale of 0–5, as defined in Chapter 
III. The cumulative and combined categorical distributions for each section of the four 
strategies are shown in Table 1. 
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 Number and Percentage of Strategies That Address Unpredictable 
Change for DOD/Government Strategic Documents 








0 0 1 0 0 1 0.80% 
1 2 8 0 0 10 8.00% 
2 2 9 2 0 13 10.40% 
3 7 9 2 2 20 16.00% 
4 13 20 9 4 46 36.80% 
5 13 9 10 3 35 28.00% 
Average 3.89 3.18 4.17 4.11 3.84  
Total 37 56 23 9 125  
 
Of primary significance to UUCCS is the Combined Average Unpredictable 
Change element, at an average of 3.84. This means that on average, the strategies discussed 
are mostly aimed to posture for anticipated change, with specific or vague uncertainty 
limited to a single or general concept. Multiple strategies, such as those designed for 
innovation, designed to cause change, or including second- and third- order effects, raised 
the metric. Of note, the DOD strategies had fewer strategic sections per document as 
compared to the NCS but had higher averages to address the unpredictable change 
category. The NCS had significantly more strategic sections, but a lower unpredictable 
change category score, weighting the combined average lower. This is further discussed in 
the next section. 
Overall, roughly one third of the strategic sections are coded category 0–3, meaning 
these elements are at best are designed to modernize or address a single specific problem, 
or possibly a broad general problem set that doesn’t consider second- and third- order 
effects. Roughly more than one third of the total strategic sections are category 4, designed 
to address second- or third- order effects, and a little less than another third is category 5—
designed to cause change. The comparison to industry is in Table 3 in Chapter V. 
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Without further comparison, the data is indicative that a significant proportion of 
anticipating future change is already present in DOD and government strategy, though not 
all change is aimed at cyberspace. Ultimately, however, ideal strategy may not be 
represented by the highest ranking, or by having every strategic element be a 5 on the scale. 
Some blend of 0–5 to manage a multitude of issues allows for focusing on higher priority 
strategies that may require a higher dedication to change. Additionally, the narrative in a 
strategy that provides the qualitative information may use elements that focus the strategy 
more appropriately to drive the organization in the direction desired. These issues are 
discussed further in the qualitative analysis, below. 
The focus of this thesis is to determine UUCCS, in which directs interest to the 
higher ranked strategic sections, and those that specifically apply to cyberspace. With 
approximately 80% of all strategic sections addressing some form of future change at a 3, 
4, or 5, it is reasonable to conclude that DOD and government strategies do a good job of 
focusing its strategies to address change. Potential for the DOD to nevertheless improve on 
these measures is discussed at the conclusion of this chapter, following the qualitative 
analysis.  
Anticipation of change in these strategies, however, is far more effective if the 
strategic provisions are accompanied by explicit provisions for implementation. As 
discussed in Chapter III, this research analyzed each strategic section to track Action Items, 
MOS/MOE, Timelines, Feedback, and Budget Allocation; and explicitly tracked when any 
of these elements were missing. Table 2 provides the data for the four strategic documents. 
Figure 3 shows the Combined Average tallies for Action Items, MOS/MOE, Timelines, 
Feedback, Budget Allocation, Empty Elements, and the Combined Average Unpredictable 
Change calculation. Full data tables are located in Appendix B. 
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 Average Number of Implementation Elements per Section for 
DOD/Government Strategic Documents 
Element NDS NCS DCS CCV All Four 
Action Items 10.11 8.93 8.61 18.67 11.58 
MOS/MOE 4.70 3.20 3.74 5.89 4.38 
Timelines 0.51 0.18 0.70 1.33 0.68 
Feedback 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.67 0.38 
Budget Allocation 0.57 0.11 0.04 0 0.18 
Empty Elements 2.32 2.66 2.22 2.11 2.33 
 
 
Figure 3. DOD/Government Strategy Combined Averages 
The first major metric of significance is the Empty Elements per Strategic Section. 
On average, there are 2.33 empty elements per strategic section across all four documents. 
This means that for nearly every strategic section, two- to- three of five implementation 
categories are not included in the strategy. Mostly, these missing elements are Timelines, 
Feedback, and budget categories. These findings support the GAO 2013 report that 
indicates these elements tend to be missing. Therefore, while this area of strategy may have 
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There is an average of 11.58 Action Items per strategic section, indicating 
significant direction and action required of the organization for each section. For those 
Action Items, on average there are 4.38 MOS/MOE per strategic section. Sometimes the 
strategy’s measure of success is obvious, such as from the NCS, “The Administration will 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies and the expectations on the private 
sector related to cybersecurity risk management and incident response (The White House, 
2018, p. 8).” These kinds of strategies are assumed by leadership to not require clarification 
on a measure of success. A positive use of an MOS/MOE is from the DOD Cyber Strategy: 
“Expand crowd-sourced vulnerability identification: … in order to identify and mitigate 
vulnerabilities more effectively and to foster innovation (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018a, p. 6).” The MOS/MOE is clearly noted as an end goal, strengthening the 
strategy’s purpose. 
As noted above, the elements that tended to be ignored in the strategies are the 
Timelines, Feedback mechanisms and Budget Allocations, with averages of 0.68, 0.38, and 
0.18, respectively. This means Timelines, Feedback, or Budget Allocations are not 
significantly included in every strategic section. Timelines are observed to be neglected 
because many strategies are designed to direct regular activities that would never stop. 
Alternatively, there are many strategies that stated a fixed goal but no timeline to indicate 
the urgency of that goal or when it is to be accomplished. The lack of Feedback 
mechanisms may have been assumed by the strategy, in that accountability or official 
Feedback mechanisms are not necessary to include in the strategy. The better Feedback 
mechanisms assigned an entity responsible to monitor activities for effectiveness or 
completion of the strategy. Finally, federal and military budget is generally distilled to 
“prioritization in the budget” or a single reference to a national fiscal year budget in the 
NDS (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 6). To align with the GAO 2013 
report recommendations, these are elements that can use improvement.  
More detailed analysis links MOS/MOEs, Timelines, Feedback, and Budget 
Allocation to the Action Items. As discussed in Chapter III, the ratios are designed to 
represent percentage of internal relationships between the Action Items and the associated 
elements that strengthen and clarify the strategic section. This ratio is to account for style 
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within each strategy, so that regardless of length or high or low tallies, the ratio would be 
more comparable between strategic documents. Figure 4 shows the ratio of these elements 
to the Action Items, which more clearly demonstrates how much or little the other elements 
of strategy are applied against the Action Items.  
 
Figure 4. DOD Combined Ratios across All Four Documents 
On average, approximately 40% the Action Items include MOS/MOEs (combined 
ratio MOS/MOE over Action Items category), whereas less than 6% include Timelines 
(combined ratio Timelines over Action Items category) or Feedback mechanisms 
(combined ratio Feedback over Action Items category), and less than 2% include Budget 
Allocation (combined ratio budget over Action Items category). Again, the purpose of the 
ratio is to assess document-internal consistency. For example, the NCS has 56 strategic 
sections as compared to the U.S. CYBERCOM Command Vision’s 9 strategic sections. 
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and the U.S. CYBERCOM Command Vision packs nearly 19 Action Items and 6 MOS/
MOEs per strategic section. However, both demonstrated a similar ratio of MOS/MOE to 
Action Items at 35% and 31% respectively. Therefore, the ratio accounts for variation in 
style and is better able to show similarities and comparisons.  
Additionally, the Combined Ratio of Cyberspace Specific strategies is nearly 90%, 
which is largely due to the use of three cyberspace-focused strategic documents (combined 
ratio of cyberspace specific category). The NDS had the lowest number of cyberspace-
specific strategic sections at approximately 41% (combined minimum cyberspace specific 
ratio category). This is an expected finding, particularly because while the NDS is applied 
for the entire DOD, and the other strategies are specifically selected to look at cyberspace 
strategy. However, the comparison and significance are more obvious when compared to 
industry strategies in Chapter V and Figure 6. 
B. EXPLANATION OF QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
The following qualitative assessment first presents a collation of the common 
themes across all four DOD/government strategies, followed by sections for the individual 
strategies that highlight specific elements not seen in the others. Each section summarizes 
the approach taken by the DOD/government to answer the UUCCS question based on the 
qualitative methodology discussed in Chapter III. 
1. Common Themes That Address UUCCS 
As alluded to in previous chapters and evident in the data reviewed in the preceding 
section, there are elements common to each strategy that address some element of change, 
either directly or indirectly, cyberspace or non-cyberspace. Much of the analysis follows 
similar themes introduced in the literature, including partnership, innovation, and agility.  
 Competition and Persistence 
In the NCS, NDS, and DOD Cyber Strategy, new language from previous strategies 
indicates a higher level of engagement in cyberspace. The emphasis is now on competition 
in cyberspace, which is a change in mentality from the previous “cybersecurity,” or “cyber 
warfare.” Now, each strategy includes new language referring to a higher state of 
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operations: in the NCS, “continuous competition” (White House, 2018, p. 2) and “now-
persistent engagement” (p. 20); the NDS’ goal of “strategy to compete” (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 1); and the DOD Cyber Strategy’s use of persistence 
(United States Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 4). This higher state of operations is a 
daily, 24/7 presence and effort to maintain competitive edge in cyberspace. This 24/7 
presence is also being integrated into other areas that are becoming increasingly cyberspace 
related or dependent, and therefore requiring increased awareness among all personnel. 
This is especially evident in the DOD Cyber Strategy’s emphasis on institutional culture, 
for all personnel and at all levels, that is more aware of cyberspace and decision-making 
that involves cyberspace (United States Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 5). 
 Integration into Multiple Domains 
Each strategy includes a significant priority to integrate cyberspace into the entire 
spectrum of operations. The NCS (White House, 2018) uses language that aims to include 
cyber into every element of national power (p. 20), later emphasizing diplomatic, 
information, military, financial, intelligence, public attribution, and law enforcement 
capabilities (p. 21). These are later echoed by the NDS (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018b, p. 4), which is then narrowed and focused for the DOD Cyber strategy 
into a deterrence strategic section (United States Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 4).  
Integration strategy also continues bringing cyberspace out of an intelligence-only 
focus, recognizing the power and potential for supporting and enhancing other domains. 
Consistency on this theme through all four documents lends strength to the effort overall 
and assists in bringing the challenges of cyberspace to the forefront of every domain and 
element of national power, and to the many government agencies that are now utilizing and 
depending on cyberspace significantly. State and non-state malicious actors are already 
utilizing cyberspace technology, which poses a threat to U.S. efforts and interests. 
Recognizing the vulnerability in all aspects of life due to cyberspace requires bolstering 
the integration of cyberspace efforts in anticipation of adversary aggression (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 3). 
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 Automation and Data Analytics 
The NDS and DOD Cyber Strategy highlighted automation and data analytics 
significantly, acknowledging the need for data processing and speed not attainable by 
human operators alone (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 7; United States 
Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 4). These are merely mentioned in NCS, but not at all in 
USCYBERCOM Command Vision. The NCS, being a broader national strategy, does not 
cite very many specific technologies, particularly because it is addressed also to private 
sector partners which are so varied that significant technological specificity might hinder 
rather than enhance. The focus for the NDS and DOD Cyber Strategy on automation are to 
gain military advantage, identify malicious cyber activity, and improve defensive posture. 
The specificity and direction offered here is focused and clear toward cybersecurity 
posture, which addresses concerns of ambiguity previously mentioned in GAO reports and 
by Clinton (2015). Chapter V will discuss how this particular strategy may be expanded. 
 Partnerships, Understanding Differences in Industry, and Information 
Sharing Analysis 
Significant portions of the baseline strategies are dedicated to partnerships. These 
partnerships include industry, academia, intra-governmental agencies, and inter-
government relationships. This is a significant recognition that the government is not the 
only entity required to defend and use U.S. cyberspace capabilities, that the DOD will not 
have all the answers to unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change, and requires close 
relationship with the industry that will have necessary expertise, resources, capability, and 
focus to address those changes.  
Listed partnerships included international partners, government agencies, private 
sector, and academia. Partnerships are further refined to include shared challenges and 
interests, and which also provide regional coalitions and security cooperation. The NDS 
also includes “small companies, start-ups” as partnership opportunities (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018b p. 8). It also recognizes that every ally and partner is unique 
and emphasizes that interoperability between these relationships is required. Other 
partnership purposes highlight trade, energy, and political stability, as well as an exchange 
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of ideas and best practices (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 9; White 
House, 2018, p. 26).  
Three directions are held in common in the partnership strategies are: Information 
sharing, reporting, and coordination. Reporting and coordination between government 
agencies are already a part of policy and procedure, though they can always be improved. 
Information sharing, however, is a strategy that leaves much to be desired. The strategies 
do not clarify the legal separations, de-classification, and inter-agency coordination needed 
to support cross-sector information sharing, using terms like “as much as possible” in the 
NCS (White House, 2018, p. 9) or “to the maximum extent possible” in the 
USCYBERCOM Command Vision (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018, p. 10).  
Most especially, the strategies direct “timely” information sharing, such as the NCS 
(United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 21), leaving significant room for 
interpretation. Because information loses intelligence value over time, particularly for 
imminent attacks, timely information sharing might be subjectively interpreted by the 
government. This may potentially cause delays in time-sensitive actionable information. 
Instead, the bureaucratic processes, de-classification, and potential risks of loss of 
governmental intelligence capability become a strong barrier to the information sharing 
process. 
 Imperatives for Cultural and Technological Innovation 
Innovation is regularly referenced within each strategy as a necessity. The DOD 
Cyber Strategy offers the most specific direction and definition for desired results, echoed 
by the USCYBERCOM vision statement’s focus on disruptive innovation: innovate for 
agility to keep pace with evolving threats and technologies in cyberspace faster than 
strategic competitors (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 4; U.S. Cyber 
Command, 2018, p. 8).  
Innovation is defined both culturally and technologically. Culturally, in the NDS, 
“Organize for innovation” and “evolve innovative operational concepts” are kinds of 
strategies to address unpredictable change because they are intended to cause change 
internally (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 10, 7). Further clarifying this 
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direction, the NDS provides a measure of effectiveness, that “[i]f current structures hinder 
substantial increases in lethality or performance, [then] Service Secretaries and Agency 
heads will consolidate, eliminate or restructure (p. 10).” Similarly, each strategic document 
acknowledges the need to innovate, which is indicated to be one of the strongest UUCCS 
elements: to be proactive, be ahead of developments, and to cause change that can be 
managed rather than react to change. 
 Agility Aspirations 
Each of the strategies includes agility or a similar term to address change, either 
anticipated or unpredictable. The NCS focuses on the terms, “adaptability,” “resilience,” 
and “innovation” in cybersecurity (White House, 2018, p. 15). The NDS, DOD Cyber 
Strategy, and U.S. CYBERCOM Command Vision each use agility for posture, innovation, 
processes, or operations (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 7; United States 
Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 4; U.S. Cyber Command, 2018, p. 9).  
Agility is assumed to be understood, is broadly applied, and is not necessarily 
specific to cyberspace, as in the NDS, but is included by implication. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, the DOD Dictionary does not include a definition for agility (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2020), and the inferred definition from Joint Publication 5-0 indicates an ability to 
adapt in a timely manner based on a situational context (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017, p. I-
15.b). There are no sections that direct a specific metric framework to unify the entirety of 
the DOD or government. Connecting agility to cyberspace is further discussed in the Sub-
Questions Analysis section below. 
2. National Defense Strategy 2018 (NDS) 
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) (United States Department of Defense, 
2018b) is the guiding strategic document for the entire DOD and is not cyberspace centric. 
The primary and most relevant key strength to UUCCS in the NDS is the acknowledgement 
of a prioritization of cyberspace (p. 6). A section including cyberspace as a warfighting 
domain had not been prominently presented in previous versions of the NDS. This section 
directs that cyberspace should be prioritized for investments and integration into the 
spectrum of military operations. The prioritization had not appeared quite so strongly in 
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previous national-level defense strategy and speaks to the recognition that the DOD is not 
immune to cyberspace change, despite previous superiority. This acknowledgement aims 
to bring the change to the forefront of national efforts to integrate and modernize 
cyberspace capabilities.  
However, this section specifically differentiates cyberspace from Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR), which is heavily dependent on cyberspace, if not specifically a part of cyberspace. 
Differentiating the concepts confuses authorities, and roles and responsibilities. At best, 
the difference is largely ignored, but makes the strategy more ambiguous and decouples 
cyberspace integration into the full spectrum of military operation, as is directed (p. 6). 
Also, the NDS includes key terms and concepts such as “agility” and “resilience,” 
highlighting those desired outcomes for all domain capabilities (air, surface, subsurface, 
etc.). As discussed in the previous section, these concepts are assumed to be understood 
but particularly difficult to apply and implement in cyberspace at an every-day, operational 
or lower level.20 Yet, despite the difficult nature in translating into the low-level of 
cyberspace, fostering a competitive mindset or culture that includes agility and resilience 
can be applied to cyberspace and the problem of uncertainty and unpredictability, just like 
for industry. 
The NDS discusses talent, acknowledging that military, civilian and contractor 
personnel are all responsible for the best practices and accomplishment of the mission. 
Leadership is highlighted for education and development for decision making. This is 
specifically differentiated from the civilian workforce, which aims to bring in new and 
critical skills. As compared to the other DOD strategies, this section on talent management 
is more specific in who the strategy supports and what actions shall be taken to achieve the 
goal. The primary specification is the Professional Military Education (PME), which is not 
specifically repeated in the other strategy documents (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018b, p. 8). 
 
20 Also discussed in Chapter IV.B.1.f. 
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The NDS offers speed of relevance as a key to success, desiring to change the 
current DOD culture that is “over-optimized at the expense of providing timely decisions, 
policies, and capabilities…” (United States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 10). As a 
strategy, it is both aspirational and necessary. The difficulty in this strategy will be in the 
implementation, and that there is no direction on measure of success, who will be 
responsible, or Feedback to demonstrate success or even iterate this strategy as it is 
implemented. Additionally, the interpretation of “speed of relevance” hypothetically 
increases risk. The risk is that various stakeholders may use ambiguity to accomplish their 
revenue goals over the DOD’s mission focus, particularly if a long-term “speed of 
relevance” increases profits for that organization. 
Overall, the NDS strategizes increased military capability and includes cyberspace 
significantly in that projection. Specifically, this increased military capability includes 
modernization to address anticipated change, and innovation to address unpredictable and 
uncertain change. 
3. National Cyber Strategy 2018 (NCS) 
The National Cyber Strategy 2018 (NCS) (White House, 2018) is an all-of-
government strategy, and so has elements of law enforcement, DHS, DOD, IC, and FBI 
included throughout the document. Most importantly, this strategy is the first actual 
national cyberspace strategy, as opposed to the previous Cybersecurity National Action 
Plan (White House, 2016). Of note, the strategy follows some recommendations made in 
the 2013 GAO (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013) report by 
addressing integration and more clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the 
government and enacting cyberspace into clearer national level strategy. 
One of the key differences in the NCS from the others is a paragraph in the 
introduction section dedicated to the definition of success in cyberspace. It is broad, 
encompassing vulnerability identification and protection, resilience, incident response, 
destabilizing malicious cyber activities, deterrence through imposition of costs through 
both cyber and non-cyber means, and using cyber capabilities to accomplish U.S. national 
security objectives (White House, 2018, p. 3). As compared to the DOD strategies, having 
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this particular section demonstrates a more concise direction, despite the higher-level and 
broad nature of the document. 
Also specific to the NCS is the clearest “partnership” directive out of all the 
strategies. A specific section directs subordinates to “Leverage information 
communications technology providers as cybersecurity enablers (White House, 2018, p. 
9).” This is the only strategy of all four that highlights a specific group of stakeholders for 
partnerships with a specific task implication. This highlights the unique position of 
communications providers to handle risks within their networks or for customers that the 
DOD/government is unable to reach. Part of the advantage is that a private sector entity 
can respond to unpredictable and uncertain market changes or threats (which is its own 
incentive and the organization’s best interest) quicker than the entirety of government, 
since this is what keeps the organization’s competitive advantage. 
The NCS is the only document of the four that directly addresses supply chain risk 
management. This has been increasingly of concern, where vulnerabilities at any point in 
the chain weaken the whole structure (p. 6–7). This is a newer strategic concern that the 
private sector has been addressing for decades already, but is meant to control the uncertain 
possibility of adversaries inserting vulnerabilities and malicious cyberspace capability into 
the supply chain in such a way they would be undetected and gain adversarial advantage 
in the future. 
The strategies for talent management are concerned with hiring good talent or 
leveraging partnerships that might have talent capability not contained within the 
government. This is the most specific strategy of the four on this issue because it establishes 
the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) framework as the methodology 
to use for standardized cyberspace hiring practices (p. 17). This is not repeated or reflected 
in the DOD strategies. These strategies also include incentives to retain talent, including 
training and operational opportunity, but are limited because much of any normal incentive 
is monetary. The government cannot compete with industry for monetary incentive, having 
rigid pay scale structures that are generally considered non-competitive when compared to 
industry for the same jobs. Rewards, recognition, and training are included, but not 
specified, and are also limited by the same resource constraints for monetary reward.  
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Related to talent management is the assignment of significant roles and 
responsibilities to specific leadership, such as departmental Chief Information Officers 
(CIO), and the expectation to hold leadership accountable for risk management decisions 
and information technology (IT) procurement (p. 7). The other strategies do not include 
specific roles or address cyberspace leadership specifically. 
One theme throughout the whole document is the development of metrics and the 
use of risk management, but most of it is assigned to the current White House 
administration for action (p. 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 25). This is a very significant 
observation: in other strategies, the entity assigned responsibility for action is vague or 
non-existent; here, the administration is taking responsibility to develop those metrics and 
apply the risk management. Assessing the implementation of this strategic element is out 
of scope for this thesis, but future research should assess whether those recommended 
metrics and tools are pushed down to be used at all levels, which would make the strategy 
more valuable. Due to the DOD’s size and the government’s bureaucratic nature, change 
to utilize these tools at all levels can be expected to be a significant difficulty. 
4. The DOD Cyber Strategy 2018 
The DOD Cyber Strategy (United States Department of Defense, 2018a), 
subordinate to the NDS and NCS, brings in elements of both and has a few increasingly 
specific elements that apply directly to the DOD. Where the NDS aims to integrate into 
strategic competition “multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, 
economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement and military” (United States Department 
of Defense, 2018b,  p. 4), the DOD Cyber Strategy loses the connection to several key 
elements of strategic competition. Instead, strategic competition is distilled in cyberspace 
only to military, infrastructure, and economic threats. Diplomatic, information and law 
enforcement efforts are only referenced in coordination or sharing with other Federal 
departments and agencies, and those not specifically, but rather as “partners” (p. 5). Of 
interest, this leaves efforts to generate diplomatic and informational effects to the other 
agencies and does not provide for diplomatic and informational capabilities within the 
department for its own missions. The NCS demonstrates that diplomatic and informational 
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capabilities are becoming increasingly important as missions and operations can be 
exposed quickly with decreased secrecy due to media and propaganda proliferation (White 
House, 2018, p. 2). This language is lost in the DOD Cyber Strategy and leaves a significant 
capability gap that remains unaddressed. 
Other themes are also addressed in the other documents, but increased direction 
would be expected in a subordinate strategy. Issues such as accelerating cyber capability 
development, streamlining acquisitions, and the challenges of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products are discussed in all the strategies, but are not further refined as a 
subordinate strategy. These strategies are also difficult to measure and define as successful, 
making implementation at all levels difficult, and individual interpretations that stovepipe 
efforts cannot be integrated or compared to other efforts at a larger scale. Additionally, 
many jobs have been created for the sole purpose of processing and handling acquisitions 
and maintenance of these systems, and to streamline these might remove these kinds of 
positions, where removing positions and reorganizing is a significant challenge in the 
government. These types of challenge tend to reside at a very high level, as similarly 
discussed in the NDS, and in some cases may not be applicable because the DOD is bound 
by the rules of governing policies, like the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR), 
limiting how fast and effective changes can be made when it comes to acquisitions. The 
Sub-Question Analysis section below further discusses this topic.  
The DOD Cyber Strategy continues to highlight critical infrastructure, in line with 
efforts originally presented by the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (White House, 
2016). The DOD strategy distinguishes two definitions: The Defense Critical Infrastructure 
(DCI) and U.S. Critical Infrastructure. DCI is applied to the systems and infrastructure of 
the DOD and non-DOD assets to support DOD (United States Department of Defense, 
2018a, p. 2,3), whereas much U.S. Critical Infrastructure falls under DHS in authority. 
Some of the document describes the critical infrastructure information sharing previously 
mentioned in other strategies, but this falls under DHS largely (Congressional Research 
Service, 2019, p. 3). Much of the sharing is also handled at a very high level, and so the 
strategy becomes minimally applicable to lower-level operators. However, the effort to 
defend critical infrastructure is significant, and this attention is a recognition of the 
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tremendous vulnerability within these systems that increases the likelihood of 
unpredictable or uncertain malicious efforts. 
One concept in the DOD Cyber Strategy that connects to Cold-War nuclear era 
thinking is “deterrence,” which is used in many broad DOD strategies, as well as in the 
NCS. The NCS discusses deterrence in the context of all instruments of national power, 
modernization of statutes and norms, and international coalitions (White House, 2018, p. 
21). The specificity from the NCS is lost in the DOD Cyber Strategy. Instead, deterrence 
becomes less specific concept, perhaps depending on prior thinking to provide definitions 
and scope for cyberspace deterrence.  
Deterrence in cyberspace has been a contested concept for a long time, with 
significant evolution of thinking and contributions from many strategic specialists.21 
Research shows that the ease of entry and cost for malicious actors is very low compared 
to the potential gains.22 Proof of guilt and attribution, global reach, and obstacles to 
punitive responses make the concept of deterrence in cyberspace difficult. Without serious 
consequences, applied quickly, consistently, and publicly, the malicious state actor tends 
to have little to fear, particularly across international jurisdictional lines, as discussed by 
Demchak (2012). Yet, despite these challenges, trenchant insufficiencies of defense in 
cyberspace keep deterrence in the forefront of strategic thinking, as is exemplified by one 
of the newest articulations, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report (King and 
Gallagher, 2020).  
Certainly, effective cyber deterrence would be highly beneficial to prevent 
unpredictable and uncertain issues before they arise. While this aspirational deterrence goal 
in the DOD Cyber Strategy is desirable, the strategy does not clarify what direction to take, 
or include Action Items, Feedback, metrics, or Timelines for implementation. This leaves 
unclear what deterrence might mean, how it can be applied, and how much our strategy 
can depend on it. Certainly, the research makes obvious that many malicious cyber actors 
 
21 For a seminal work, see Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica:  RAND 
Corporation, 2009), ISBN 978–0-8330-4734-2. 
22 See section I.C.a 
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are not deterred often, and yet any successful deterrence is not made common public 
knowledge, further weakening perceived results in a deterrence strategy. 
Talent in the DOD Cyber Strategy is addressed more vaguely than the NDS. The 
majority of the four sections distill to some variation on building and supporting talent, 
offer a few skills desired, but demonstrate that much of the work to develop incentives and 
programs has yet to be established (United States Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 6). 
Naturally, that is what a strategy is for, but this highlights that the human resources 
capability for cyberspace has still not caught up to modern talent management 
methodologies. Nearly a decade after the establishment of USCYBERCOM, the need to 
develop talent management practices over adjusting practices that should have been already 
established demonstrates how far behind the DOD is to industry in talent management. 
Lastly, the document offers a short and specific note on the use of crowd-sourced 
vulnerability identification as a strategy. This is a newer concept, adopted from industry, 
that allows for outside sources to comb through networks and applications to find 
vulnerabilities that the engineers or operators may not have found. This is a specific action 
that is not in any other strategic document, certainly is an effort to address cyberspace 
changes, and has been proven to be effective, both in cost and in generating increased 
resilience. 
5. USCYBERCOM Command Vision 2018 
The USCYBERCOM Command Vision (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018) contains 
many of the same elements of the first several strategic documents, including: partnerships, 
agility, and increased resiliency. A notable variation observed for this document is use of 
the term “persistence” in lieu of the term “competition” (p. 6). This may be due to the 
translation from high-level document to lower level application of the strategy, but it could 
also reflect a refinement of thinking about how specifically the U.S. should engage 
adversaries in the competitive cyberspace environment. Indicatively, persistence is well 
defined in the CYBERCOM Command Vision, answering the questions of “how,” 
“where,” “when,” and “why” (p. 6).  
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Of note, the spirit of this document is focused on defensive and offensive cyber 
operations, which have specific meanings and authorities, but the usage does not reach into 
the other domains that utilize cyberspace just as heavily. The other domains have high tech 
cyberspace components, such as modern guided weapons, radars, aircraft, submarines, 
ships, vehicles, and communications between all of them. All of these technologies have 
hardware and software associated with them, but USCYBERCOM is largely uninvolved 
in the acquisitions, security, monitoring, or vulnerability analysis of these systems outside 
of the network they connect to, and has no authority to impose actions to integrate into the 
other domains. This is partially addressed by partnering with the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the rest of the 
Intelligence Community (IC), which may have more insight into the other domains (U.S. 
Cyber Command, 2018, p. 7). The strategic limitation in resources is specifically addressed 
in the Risk Mitigation section, which projects that the scare resource of USCYBERCOM’s 
capacity would be directed for strategic use, depending on increased resilience in DOD 
systems to combat malicious actors. 
The USCYBERCOM Command Vision has a new element that the previous 
strategies did not: a full section describing USCYBERCOM’s approach to Risk Mitigation 
(p. 10). Specifically, constrained resources require prioritization of adversary targets and 
care to mitigate diplomatic risk in cyberspace actions. The section self-identifies a 
weakness to address change, particularly due to a capacity limitation to respond to the 
diplomatic issues. But it does not discuss that the U.S. Department of State handles many 
diplomatic issues, which might be clarified with a stipulation on partnership between the 
departments. Instead, operations are done with “allies and coalition partners,” which is not 
indicative of whether the Department of State is included. The constrained resources also 
show that outside the prioritized targets, the “high-demand, low-density maneuver force” 
is not likely to respond to changes quickly, due to prioritization already being applied. This 
is a self-declared limitation in capacity to address change. The proposed mitigation is to 
increase resiliency to DOD systems and sharing intelligence with intra-governmental 
partners. 
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The last section of this document is an implementation guidance to the subordinate 
forces and includes specific Feedback mechanisms and responsibilities under the 
USCYBERCOM Chief of Staff. Additionally, the mentioned key measure of success is 
execution by all personnel (p. 10). As a measure of success, this is a challenge, because it 
does not include any measurable definition which makes it difficult to hold subordinates 
accountable. However, this section provides the most specific Feedback mechanism and 
expectation of execution by subordinates, which is not included in the higher-level 
documents. 
6. Sub-question Analysis 
The core question of UUCCS requires addressing additional sub-questions to 
further refine the baseline analysis of these DOD/government strategies. The quantitative 
results measure how much each element of strategy is provided within each strategic 
section and then in a combined method. The qualitative sections built on this overarching 
cumulative data by discussing specific DOD/government strategy results that address 
UUCCS. Assessing the two sets of results together helps answer the sub-questions.  
The first sub-question considers whether these strategies will be effective in the 
future; an assessment drawing on the preceding quantitative and qualitative analysis 
identifies potential gaps and the opportunity for the utilization of private sector lessons 
learned. The second sub-question uses the prior assessment to determine whether the DOD 
can improve on the current strategies, and whether certain aspects of strategy may not be 
required to be addressed. These questions lead to Chapter V, where the lessons learned for 
UUCCS are presented and compared. 
 Effectiveness of Cyberspace Strategies in the Future 
The assessment of quantitative and qualitative results poses challenges for the 
future effectiveness of U.S. cyberspace strategies. To start, while agility is mentioned in 
some form in each strategy, ambiguous used of the term raises some issues. Chapter II 
demonstrated that agility can be applied to thinking and cyberspace metrics and leaves 
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much room for interpretation.23 Agility is one of the more explored concepts in the 
literature, but if it is not specifically defined, particularly for cyberspace at a fundamental 
level, the DOD may not get the desired effect out of its strategy.  
The reason is a technical one: much technology, particularly networked cyberspace, 
requires disparate elements to follow standardized rules that generally remain static to 
interface with other disparate elements. The internet, for example, specifically 
communicates using protocols that allows communication to pass through and interact with 
numerous organizations, hardware, and software to get from its originator to destination. 
Much of this standardization is static. To create agility within a network introduces an 
amount of unpredictability and uncertainty for adversaries, but also increases complexity 
for the owners and administrators of the network, potentially giving the administrators the 
same amount of unpredictability and uncertainty that the adversary has. For the 
administrator to decrease the unpredictability and uncertainty despite increased complexity 
requires increased control and knowledge of the network.  
As the government is discovering, there is already tremendous complexity in the 
interfaces between the extremely large set of DOD and contracted networks and other 
networks and critical infrastructure not owned by the DOD—a wicked problem. Whereas 
the DOD Cyber Strategy specifically aims to “Innovate to foster agility” (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018a,  p. 4), Schousboe (2020) cautions that innovations do not 
always benefit the organization, and quotes Demchak to say that innovation may increase 
organizational complexity even while increasing organizational effectiveness. This 
complex system decreases the amount that individual administrators can know and control. 
At a broader level, attempting to know and control these complex systems requires 
integration of cyberspace systems, rarely emphasized in the DOD/government strategies, 
which requires an increase of static standardization so the systems can interact with each 
other. This effort aims to decrease complexity and the difficulties that arise with that 
complexity, yet it is antithetical to agility.  
 
23 See Chapter II.A.1. 
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The technical discussion on networking is an example, but the issue extends to all 
of cyberspace. Cyberspace operates at a technical and logical level, and requires stable, 
static protocols to operate smoothly. While the stable nature of cyberspace is desired for 
the smoother operations, malicious actors take advantage of such stability for their 
operations. Additionally, as technologies change or are added, and organizations scale in 
cyberspace, current technology also must keep pace with growth. Thus, for cybersecurity 
and technology change, agility as a strategy has been conceptualized in both public and 
private sectors as a key concept for decades. But the concept becomes ambiguous as a DOD 
cyberspace strategy without reinforcing that strategy with higher definition, measures of 
effectiveness and success, and other direction and definition to move beyond a buzzword 
and into practice. Without the unification of a single system of measurement, quality 
decisions on the effectiveness of an “agile” capability are less likely because the 
information provided to decision makers will require further analysis to compare 
differences and meaning. 
Similar to agility is the concept of “speed of relevance,” designed to streamline 
acquisitions and development, discussed in the NDS and DOD Cyber Strategy (United 
States Department of Defense, 2018b, p. 10; United States Department of Defense, 2018a, 
p. 4). The specific section on the “speed of relevance” proposes streamlining rapid, 
iterative, and modular upgrade approaches from development to fielding new technologies. 
This is admittedly necessary for competitive edge, and a quality mindset to address 
unpredictable and uncertain cyberspace change. However, this strategy can be difficult in 
its implementation due to governmental acquisitions regulations that are broader than the 
DOD and restrict the effectiveness of this very effort. The Federal Acquisitions Regulations 
(FAR) (2020) determines actual acquisitions processes for the DOD, challenging the 
effectiveness of this strategy. The DOD is not responsible for managing these regulations 
and is subject to follow them. Therefore, aiming to streamline acquisitions at the speed of 
relevance may not be as effective simply because the DOD must still follow external 
regulations. 
In addition to regulation restrictions, scalability applied across the DOD at a macro, 
departmental level, as opposed to a micro, more tactical unit level, takes many years to 
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implement, which is very rarely considered “rapid.” In addition, there are numerous 
limitations to apply use of already developed-commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
cyberspace tools into the broader DOD, IC, and Federal cyberspace systems. The main 
limitation is that the certification process for a COTS system to be allowed into a 
government system has a high barrier to entry and high cost, both in resources and time. 
This tends to preclude smaller industry organizations that could potentially field cheap and 
reasonable solutions to problems, but would cost too much to certify, pushing that solution 
to different, lower cost markets. 
Similarly, the concept of modernization, while purposeful, necessary, and well-
reasoned in the strategy, presents some challenges. Modernization as a strategy is closely 
related to innovation and speed of relevance cycles which may be an issue in the future. 
Much strategic cyberspace infrastructure and capability has been showing its age and 
increasing vulnerability and decreased capability in comparison to modern capabilities.  
To develop and manage technologies and capabilities, many Programs of Record 
(POR) have been established within Major Commands or System Commands. These PORs 
take on the responsibility of development, acquisitions, funding, and fielding the 
technology to the warfighters. These PORs have decades of effort invested, contractual 
obligation, and huge funding lines tied to them. Some PORs have proprietary elements, 
contracts lasting for decades, and are applied at a macro level across the entire DOD, 
meaning the funding is in the billions of dollars. Many of the contractual obligations lock 
down the ability to change or adapt without a new contract, which takes tremendous time, 
potentially delaying delivery to the warfighter. If a technology becomes obsolete or less 
effective as compared to a new technology, the contracts keep the POR in place, despite 
better solutions being available. To close an entire POR and replace with a new one is 
extremely difficult for the government; it takes significant coordination, funding approvals, 
research, and development (R&D), and much time.  
The DOD/government cyber strategies do not differentiate what technology would 
constitute a need for modernization, and what could continue in use for the next decade. 
Modernization requires direction, prioritization, and planning to prevent reactionary 
responses to technology changes, which may not succeed in addressing the unpredictable 
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and uncertain cyberspace future. Also, many contracts are solidified in such a way that they 
are applied at the time of agreement, but implementation might be several years after 
agreement, after which the cyberspace capability in question has become obsolete. To 
update or change the requirement is very difficult and usually incurs significant cost. Some 
of this is addressed in most recent strategies, which aim to “…examine the use of emerging 
technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing,” and “promote 
government identification and support to these technologies” (White House, 2018, p. 15), 
or “Leverage automation and data analysis to improve effectiveness” (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 4). Yet the language of “examine” and “identification” 
found throughout the different strategies speaks to the discovery nature of the strategy 
rather than providing concrete goals for solution of those problems. Similarly, “leverage” 
and “effectiveness” speak to utilization of tools already created, rather than the aggressive, 
specific, and speedy implementation of tools to address general change, much less 
unpredictable or uncertain change. 
Another major set of strategies to address UUCCS is the heavy reliance on 
partnerships and information sharing. From the government side, information sharing is a 
major challenge due to cyberspace classifications, potential intelligence losses, and 
coordination, as has already been pointed out. From the industry perspective, information 
is a resource. The information on security posture, proprietary technology design, research 
and development, breaches, and data, etc., are resources and a source of revenue. 
Therefore, handing over data is tantamount to giving a resource away for free, which is not 
generally in industry’s best interest. This causes challenges in efforts that are specifically 
mentioned to increase information sharing, because there is little incentive for industry to 
participate, particularly if it means losing resources by the industry organization.  
Also, of concern to industry is that an organization’s public disclosure of 
cyberspace breaches can expose it to risk unrelated to the breaches, such as bad publicity 
and legal issues, obviously not in industry’s best interest. Therefore, because of strategic 
ambiguity the sectors are likely to have difficulties in matching interests and adhere to the 
strategy in the same direction, potentially decreasing the effectiveness of the strategy. The 
provisions in the DOD/government strategies are not specific on how to execute the 
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partnerships or information sharing beyond “strengthening” (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018a, p. 8; United States Department of Defense, 2018a, p. 5). A formal process 
is not discussed or referred to, leaving the accomplishment of such information sharing 
ambiguous. 
Considered cumulatively, the DOD and government strategies here are in a 
hierarchy and act as strategic communication to the rest of the government and subordinate 
units. The NCS is directive to the entire U.S. Government under the authority of the 
President, and the NDS is over the DOD. Military strategies are supposed to follow the 
hierarchy and clarify the strategy from the higher levels as they subordinate. Thus, NDS is 
over the DOD Cyber Strategy, which is over the USCYBERCOM Command Vision. As 
the layers decrease, the target audience is smaller and smaller, where generally only the 
subordinates of that department or unit are receiving or adhering to the strategy. The 
concern, therefore, is that those who may need to be directed by this strategy may not 
include the unified cyberspace strategy into their plans. Additionally, as discussed in 
Chapter II, strategy requires iteration, revision, and updating. If the strategy is not updated 
and those revisions supplied to the entire force, the strategic communication effectiveness 
becomes limited. 
As a practical example, ‘unrelated’ domains from cyberspace, such as aviation, 
subsurface, supply or acquisitions, are not expected to dig into the subordinate cyberspace 
strategies (such as the DOD Cyber Strategy) which do not apply to their own domains, yet 
cyberspace is intimately integrated into every one of their capabilities and requirements. 
The question then arises as to whether personnel in these other domains know that they are 
expected to integrate cyberspace in accordance with subordinate strategy that they are 
never expected to see. Other domains are not explicitly directed to integrate cyberspace 
strategy by the higher-level strategies, which weakens the imperative to integrate 
cyberspace strategy into the other domains. This limitation has serious implications for 
UUCCS, where vulnerabilities and changes become increasingly likely outside of the 
USCYBERCOM authority, potentially to the detriment of the DOD as a whole.  
Due to the domain differences, roles and responsibilities become ambiguous. The 
missions of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations 
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(DCO), defensive cyberspace operations-response action (DCO-RA), DOD information 
network operations (DoDIN Ops), not to mention programs of record and acquisitions, are 
not differentiated in any of these strategies, making vague the responsible entity for 
integration. Further information is required to determine that USCYBERCOM’s missions 
generally cover OCO, DCO, and DCO-RA, as opposed to DISA’s responsibility for 
DoDIN Ops, and other responsibilities include testing and certifying joint IT capabilities 
for interoperability (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2019). 
As noted, there is ambiguity within each of the documents, some of it purposeful, 
some to enable the documents to be written more concisely, some to allow subordinate 
units to properly apply specificity (or improperly apply, as the risk may indicate), and some 
because the U.S. Government and the DOD are such large organizations that any specificity 
limits the potential for flexibility in the future. 
Ambiguity and vague strategic nature allow for the strategies to be applied broadly 
without changing the strategy for the future, because the vague application supposedly 
applies to all situations. Yet, this broad application may not have the power to lead the 
organization in a defined way, and makes these strategies effectively “no-fail,” strategies, 
where any effort at all can be considered to have accomplished the entirety of the strategy 
without consequence or risk. However, the literature suggests that this methodology is not 
effective in the long run; rather, iterative changes and close monitoring of the effectiveness 
of the strategy are required.24 The organization that does not take heed of changes and 
move with the changes is likely to fail.  
Lastly, the quantitative analysis in this chapter demonstrates that some of these 
strategies do not define or include significant elements of strategy meant to clarify, 
strengthen, and implement the objectives. These missing elements include MOS/MOEs, 
Timelines, Feedback, or resource allocation (as previously discussed in the quantitative 
results section; see in particular Figure 3 and Figure 4). Leaving these very important 
components out of the strategy decreases the likelihood of accomplishment of the strategy 
at all (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 2). The subordinate 
 
24 Discussed in Chapter II.B.1. 
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employee reading the strategy may not be able to determine when the strategies should be 
accomplished, or how broadly the strategy applies. Without a measure of success, the 
subordinate commander, unit, or employee cannot declare completion or accomplishment 
of the strategy, making it an endless goal. Similarly, because the strategies are designed to 
direct immediate subordinates on a strategy, the more distant and low-level employees may 
not expect to implement the strategy when much of the implementation only exists at the 
highest levels. Without the differentiation, the entire force is not included in the strategic 
efforts. Instead they must go discover for themselves what the full answers might be, but 
do not have a guide as to where to find those answers. These are the kinds of considerations 
that should be addressed in the DOD strategies, according to the GAO report and affirmed 
by the research in this thesis.  
Some would argue that these strategies are set so that subordinate commands clarify 
implementation for each unit. However, the risk exists that lower level units may ignore 
the strategy altogether if they believe it does not apply to them, when, in fact, cyberspace 
applies to everyone. When it is not easily discernable what actions should be taken at the 
high, low, or designated level, the impact of the strategy for the entirety of the department 
is weakened. The DOD is so broad, so diverse, and so varied, that increased direction and 
unity will bring the DOD better in line to address UUCCS. Later analysis of the industry 
strategies will compare them to the DOD/government strategies in terms of these 
quantitative measurements and qualitative analysis to determine whether these questions 
can be answered, improved, or informed by industry. 
 Potential for the DOD to Improve on Current Strategies 
The quantitative data presented at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates that 
there are some good advantages in the current strategies. Table 1 indicates that the average 
strategic sections are aimed at UUCCS, either in a single aspect, (a 3 on the scale), second- 
or third- order effects (a 4 on the scale), or causing the change (a 5 on the scale), for a 
Combined Average of Unpredictable Change of 3.84. Table 2 and Figure 3 show that there 
are plenty of Action Items for the DOD to perform to implement these change-oriented 
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elements, and some MOS/MOE are present. Most of the included Timelines refer to a 
speedy capability in operations, rather than a timeline to accomplish the goal. 
While the ratios in Figure 4 show that some elements of strategy are supported by 
MOS/MOE, Timelines, Feedback, and Budget Allocation, the average of Empty Elements 
shows that improvement can be made to better manage change. However, many of the 
strategies are designed to pass down to subordinates for action, leaving the change methods 
and other strategic elements to the subordinates. This leaves significant gaps for unified 
approaches to effect change from a current state to a future state, internally and externally, 
in areas such as leadership, employees and stakeholders, processes and resources. For 
example, strategies that demand “agility” and “speed” are not just a technological strategy 
but require a certain type of thinking that is not addressed, motivated, or championed. 
Instead, the expectation is that it will be executed, simply because it is written in the 
strategy.  
That said, there is some attention to culture by the NDS, which states, “We must 
transition to a culture of performance where results and accountability matter” (p. 10). This 
is followed by a statement to empower leadership to take advantage of opportunities and 
to conduct effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Similarly, the DOD Cyber Strategy 
directs a culture change to include cyber awareness into the DOD. However, there is 
nothing that indicates how much cyber awareness is required, or how to measure the 
accomplishment of a culture of performance. 
Disruptive Innovation theory, reviewed in Chapter II, helps illustrate the more 
holistic and complex challenges that DOD/government faces in anticipating and 
incorporating cyberspace change.25  DOD strategies show that the DOD is acting as both 
an “incumbent” and as an “innovator,” with several individual strategic elements 
undertaking both direct innovation and modernization, and so evincing both types of 
organization that Disruptive Innovation Theory considers. With the modernization 
strategies, the DOD behaves as an incumbent organization, seeking to sustain performance 
 
25 See Chapter II.C. 
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with current technologies; with the innovation strategies, the DOD is seeking to improve 
performance by adopting innovative technologies.26 Each of these roles has challenges. If 
the DOD is the incumbent for a certain technology, it must be aware of the comparative 
effectiveness of newer, innovative technologies with which it might compete. Similarly, if 
the DOD is the innovator, it must determine how to ramp up levels of performance that 
compete with current technology’s use. 
Disruptive Innovation Theory can also guide procurement and acquisitions 
processes. For incumbent organizations, the adoption of modern technology might occur 
in the “Late majority” or “Laggard” time frames to take advantage of the development of 
more mature and cheaper technologies.27 For budget-minded organizations, this is an 
advantage: the cost of modernization is lower, and the technology has matured enough to 
reduce the number of problems that occur earlier in the development process. The U.S. 
Government, in its domestic role, may be well advised to lag behind private sector entities 
in the adoption of dramatic new technologies, allowing market-driven actors to “work out 
the bugs” before implementing new technologies at much larger scales.  
However, for states competing with other states, adoption of new technologies 
might be more time sensitive. The disruption model demonstrates that incumbent 
organizations may not have the power to compete against organizations that utilize 
innovative technologies to improve their capabilities (if new technology adoption goes 
relatively smoothly). This is where the earlier adoption becomes more relevant, and the 
DOD and government may need to move adoption into the “Early majority” time frame. 
Security competition in international politics especially pressures governments toward 
early adoption of potentially “game changing” technologies which may still entail 
significant risks of performance failure or collateral impacts, due to the much greater risk 
of being on the short-end of a war-deciding technological innovation.  
One historic example of this occurred in World War I, where in the early years of 
the war the German Navy was able to leap-frog 100 years of submarine development by 
 
26 See Figure 1 in Chapter II.C. 
27 See Figure 2 in Chapter II.C.2. 
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other nations and utilize the matured technology in innovative ways that the Allies, with 
heavy existing investments, where hard-pressed to emulate (A&E Television Networks, 
2018; International Encyclopedia of the First World War, 2017). In this example, the 
German Navy was the innovator, and the Allies were the incumbents. As an incumbent 
response, the Allies were forced to modernize their navies, merchant forces, and 
submarines (Vergun, 2020). Similarly, much of cyberspace has been developed by the 
United States, and now other nations are making innovative advances based on that 
development.  
Therefore, most of these DOD/government strategies could benefit from using the 
disruptive innovation model to determine whether circumstances call for a sustaining or 
innovative strategic approach, and whether to adopt new technologies earlier or later in 
their development. Using this model would at least guide decision makers in a unified 
methodology, rather than on instinct or by the ad hoc consensus of stakeholders that vary 
from element to element. 
In sum, while some DOD/government cyberspace strategies already address 
UUCCS, there is room for improvement. Strategies that include agility, speed, 
partnerships, and innovation are aimed strongly to address UUCCS. However, because the 
DOD is so broad and varied, these strategies lack of some of important elements, such as 
Timelines and Feedback. This decreases the unifying function of the strategy, pushing the 
execution to separate departments, commands, and units, which may not have all the 
experience, resources, expertise, or guidance to apply the strategy in a direction the 
leadership desires.  
To bolster DOD/government strategies and make progress in areas open for 
improvement, the DOD can apply many of the best practices and lessons learned from 
industry. Chapter V presents and compares a range of private sector strategies to these 
DOD/government strategies in order to identify the practices and lessons offering greatest 
prospects for advancing the improvements to DOD/government cyberspace strategies 
discussed in this chapter and deepening its capacity for achieving UUCCS. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY STRATEGY 
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative methodology of 
the industry strategies sampled for this thesis. Quantitative results are followed by the 
qualitative, which are compared to the DOD/government results. Best practices and lessons 
learned from these results are presented for Chapter VI’s conclusions. 
A. EXPLANATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Overall comparison of industry strategies to the DOD/governmental strategies 
demonstrated significant differences in measurements across most categories, but 
similarities in two important categories. Figure 5 summarizes these results.  
 




























































Combined Averages by Category




Perhaps most important for this thesis, the Combined Average Unpredictable 
Change category indicates that the DOD/government strategies address change at a higher 
ratio of 3.84 than does industry at 3.36. Given the conventional wisdom that private sector 
entities are more innovative, nimble, and forward-looking than government agencies, this 
finding is a surprise. This finding is discussed in more detail in Section A.1., below. 
Regarding implementational measures, Figure 5 shows that in the Combined 
Action Items per strategy section category, DOD/government strategies yield slightly 
better results than industry strategies. The Combined Action Items measure shows that the 
DOD/government had more Action Items per Strategic Section at 11.58 than did the 
counterpart industry strategies at 11.07.  
However, in the other categories industry nearly doubles the content when 
compared to the DOD/governmental strategies. Industry MOS/MOE average 6.34 to the 
DOD/government’s 4.38. The industry at least managed 1.34 Timelines per strategic 
section to the DOD/government’s 0.68 average. Similarly, industry had 1.38 Feedback 
mechanisms defined over the rarely mentioned DOD/government’s Feedback mechanisms 
at 0.38. Finally, the Budget Allocations, while not significant for industry, are nevertheless 
utilized twice as often as the DOD/government. As directed in the NCS, best practices from 
partners, e.g., industry, are to be promoted and adopted (White House, 2018, p. 14, 26). 
Although adopting “best practices” involves more than emulation, increasing the other 
elements of strategy to match or exceed those of industry is a desirable first step. 
Some of the results may have been skewed by the type of information, source 
information, and specificity provided by whatever the source information labelled as a 
strategic element. For example, the industry documents ranged from an average of 
approximately 23 Action Items to 4 Action Items for the total combined average of 11 
Action Items per strategic section. Some organizations are much more specific, and others 
are more vague. The number of strategic sections also varied, from 5 sections total to 38, 
which is what motivated the ratios for more accurate and normalized comparisons, 
discussed in Figure 6. 
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1. Average Unpredictable Change 
Table 3 compares the percentages at each rating level of industry and DOD/
government strategies that are designed to address unpredictable change. As noted above, 
overall, the DOD/government strategies addresses change at a higher overall average than 
industry, 3.84 compared to 3.36. Interestingly, the DOD/government strategies have higher 
percentages in categories 4 and 5, and industry scored higher in addressing change in 
categories 2 and 3. This means that, in general, the DOD/government is tending to utilize 
strategies that rank higher and address deeper dimensions of change more than does the 
average industry counterpart. Specifically, recalling the definitions for the ratings 
presented in Chapter III, this means DOD/government strategies posture more to anticipate 
change that may include second- and third- order effects and to act proactively to shape 
future conditions ahead of the unpredictability; industry strategies incline more to respond 
to past change or anticipate only specific future changes. 
 Number and Percentage of Strategies That Address Unpredictable 
Change for Industry vs. DOD/Government Percentage 
 
This finding does not mean that the DOD is better at change. Industry strategies 
may articulate or focus aspirations in such a way that the strategic section may not rank a 
4 or 5. Moreover, being “better at change” also involves implementing strategy, not just 
envisioning it. However, this reinforces the general observation that the DOD tends to 











0 4 1.45% 1 0.80% 
1 11 4.00% 10 8.00% 
2 43 15.64% 13 10.40% 
3 85 30.91% 20 16.00% 
4 67 24.36% 46 36.80% 
5 65 23.64% 35 28.00% 
Total 275  125  
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Overall, industry and the DOD/governmental strategies tend to address change 
strategies similarly, with individual strategies focused on innovation or new changes, and 
most either responding to a change in the technology/economy or posturing for the 
uncertainty the technology/economy presented. Many of the industry strategic sections that 
had a higher score are under a Research and Development (R&D) section, and the 
organizations that tended to have the highest average scores tended to represent the leading 
provider of the service or product, such as Intel Corporation (2019), Microsoft Corporation 
(2019), or Akamai Technologies Inc. (2019). The forward leaning nature is reflected in the 
strategy largely by specifically discussing innovation, creative solutions, and investment 
into the development beyond other organizations. The sampling of different organizations 
does show a spectrum of leading organizations to niche organizations, and the strongest 
strategies to address UUCCS are the leaders in the industry. 
2. Average Empty Elements 
One of the results that most reflects concerns in the GAO reports is in the category 
of average empty elements. In this category, the figure indicates the average number of 
missing implementation elements per strategic section, including MOS, Timelines, 
Feedback, and budget items; this category is the only one for which a lower score is better. 
Figure 5 shows that industry strategies are missing an average of 1.69 and the DOD/
government strategies missing 2.33 elements. On average, each industry category included 
at least one of every element, except for budget items.  
Notably, for both sets of strategies, budget is the most common empty element. 
Some organizations are more forthcoming in the number of dollars invested in the strategy, 
such as Intel Corporation (2019), which included growth in a specific strategy in the 
millions of dollars. This growth strategy demonstrated high investment commitment in the 
technology that was being developed. 
3. Discussion of Ratio Comparisons 
Because of the variation in strategies, ratios are included as a single metric that 
normalized the comparisons, shown in Figure 6. First, the combined ratio of cyberspace 
specific strategies highlights that the DOD/government strategies are clearly more focused 
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on cyberspace than the sampled industry strategies. This difference can be explained by 
the sampling methods: research for industry strategies aimed to get non-technological 
organizations included in the study, whereas the DOD/government samples are primarily 
cyberspace specific strategies. The minimum cyberspace specific ratios represent the 
organization that included cyberspace strategy the least, which is the NDS at about 41% 
and Tesla at 9%. This may be explained by the sampling methods again, where the strategy 
sampled for Tesla, which is an organization lauded for its advanced technology, is not one 
that is focused on cyberspace. The other industry organizations that had low cyberspace 
ratios were Marsh & McLennan Companies (2018), Pebble Beach Community Services 
District (1997), and Bank of America (2020), each of which had a cyberspace specific ratio 
for their strategic sections of under 20%. 
 














































Combined Ratios by Category




The remaining ratios represent a percentage of how many implementation elements 
within the category are directly associated with the Action Items discussed. This measure 
indicated that nearly 60% of industry strategy Action Items are associated with a MOS/
MOE, as compared to about 40% of DOD/government strategies. Nearly 14% of industry 
Action Items included Timelines, as compared to not quite 6% of DOD/government Action 
Items. Feedback mechanisms presents a more skewed 4-to-1 difference in ratios. Finally, 
only about 3.1% of the industry Action Items included specific Budget Allocation or 
prioritization, as compared to the DOD/government 1.8%. Each ratio demonstrates a 
significant difference in how industry operates its strategy by including nearly double the 
elements per Action Items, as compared to DOD/government.  
These results underscore the concerns in the GAO reports, and represent a 
significant area of improvement for the DOD in cyberspace strategy. As a best practice, 
the ratio may be a better indicator to follow for the DOD/government to improve its 
strategies, where shorter or longer strategies simply apply a ratio to attain the proper 
number of supporting strategic elements to match the industry’s best practice ratios. 
B. EXPLANATION OF QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
The qualitative results for industry strategies yield a few observations. In 
comparing the spectrum of strategies, the larger organizations tended to have similar 
strategies to the NDS, with broader application and less specificity. This means that there 
are generally fewer sections, seven or eight, for the entire presented strategy, and like the 
NDS each used language that tended to have more ambiguity in tone. Some of the smaller 
and more niche organizations had significantly more sections—twenty or more—which 
also tended to have more precise language.  
Additionally, the technology/cyberspace organizations had significantly different 
strategies than the non-tech companies, which is reflected in the ratio of cyberspace 
specific strategies. Of note, even the organizations which included cyberspace the least still 
had some reference to embracing technology, and the majority did better than the NDS’s 
40.5% cyberspace specific ratio. A possible explanation for these trends is that specificity 
for the larger organizations is found at lower levels or departmental strategies, mirroring 
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how the DOD Cyber Strategy and USCYBERCOM Command Vision carry more 
specificity than does the NDS for cyberspace. These lower-level industry strategy 
analogues were not available for the research for this thesis. Despite the effort, each of the 
nearly fifty organizations approached at the RSA 2020 conference claimed that the desired 
cyberspace-specific strategy is proprietary and would not be available publicly (similar to 
the DOD, which also has a classified portion of its strategy). Obtaining lower-level 
strategies and proprietary strategies to compare to the structure provided in the layered 
DOD strategies is a potential future research opportunity. 
Beyond these overarching observations, qualitative review of the industry strategies 
suggests a number of key lessons that could be incorporated into the DOD/government 
strategies to improve their capacities to prepare for and manage uncertainty and 
unpredictable change. The remainder of this section explores these learning opportunities. 
1. Key UUCCS Lesson Learned 
Possibly the most important lesson learned from industry for UUCCS is how 
industry focuses on integration of its systems. The DOD/government strategies already 
emphasize integrating cyberspace into operations. As a broad, DOD/government-wide 
strategy, this is absolutely imperative. However, industry’s focus on cyberspace itself 
demonstrates that integration of systems, for cybersecurity, management, analysis and 
assessment, oversight, and insight into the status of cyberspace systems, is high in 
industry’s strategic priority list.  
DOD strategies rely heavily on integrating cyberspace into other domains, but none 
point to interoperability between systems. Interconnectivity, collection of disparate data, 
centralized control, and detection for AI capability, all require integration of systems. There 
is no strategy to deal with legacy systems that will not be replaced in modernization efforts. 
Additionally, there is no direction for who is responsible for integration of systems that are 
not a network specifically, which falls under the DoDIN.  
This is contrasted greatly with industry, of which many organizations aim to 
integrate variate systems for central control, monitoring, and vulnerability analysis. 
Symantec Corporation (2018), McAfee LLC (2020), Palo Alto Networks Inc (2019), 
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Splunk Inc (2020), Edgescan (2020) and others either provide capabilities to use in addition 
to current infrastructure, are tailored for the customer, or can integrate into the 
infrastructure, not to mention build from scratch. Most include some method of 
vulnerability assessment, reporting and management, as well as ongoing updating and 
intelligence reports that keep the user apprised of threats. This specific strategy is one that 
directly addresses UUCCS and has been neglected in the overall DOD strategy. 
While challenging, a strategy of system integration would increase the capability 
of the DOD/government to address UUCCS, particularly for cybersecurity and agility. For 
example, many systems are aging, proprietary, and disconnected from each other, requiring 
laborious manual assessment to manage the highly technical analysis required to discover 
malicious actor activity. If systems are centrally monitored and managed, malicious actor 
activity would be more readily identified across the disparate systems, as central control 
allows for experts to mitigate and make decisions faster. Centralizing and managing such 
systems would provide increased oversight and management to the warfighters. Having a 
central management system increases ability to be agile as well, where issues are more 
quickly realized and can be mitigated faster than disconnected and manual systems would. 
This also addresses the increasing sophistication of malicious actors, where centralized 
management and monitoring allows for greater visibility to mitigate and respond to threats. 
The NCS has laid the groundwork for such a strategy, centralizing management of 
the government’s cybersecurity efforts under DHS, but this specifically excludes the DOD 
and the IC (White House, 2018, p. 6). This also includes assessment and review of Federal 
contractor cybersecurity risk management and practices (p. 7). The DOD Cyber Strategy 
phrases this differently to “set and enforce  standards  for cybersecurity, resilience, and 
reporting; … when requested and authorized, to provide direct assistance, including on 
non-DOD networks, prior to, during, and after an incident” (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018a, p. 3). Advancing cyberspace strategy for the excluded DOD and IC that 
corresponds to the NCS’s centralizing strategy, rather than remaining in a “responsive” 
posture, may be the next step for the DOD to address UUCCS. 
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2. Other UUCCS Lessons Learned 
The strongest industry strategies aimed to be proactive, integrated, automated, 
multi-sourced, and innovative with specified purpose. Many of these used artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, big data, and cloud solutions to automate their processes 
and information. A few examples are included here: 
• Splunk Inc. (2020) claims to be able to take in any type of data from any 
source for analysis, which is a very aspirational and highly technical 
claim.  
• Intel Corporation (2019) claims to be a leader in their field, and the 
innovative strategies reflect their leadership status. As one of the most 
established organizations in the sample group, longevity and experience 
are reflected in the MOS/MOE, Feedback mechanisms, Timelines and 
budget goal metrics which are all clearly incorporated and established into 
the strategy. 
• Akamai Technologies Inc (2019) uses its control over its vast network to 
correlate data that would not be connected otherwise. Their products are 
designed to detect change, evaluate, and respond automatically throughout 
their services and products. 
• McAfee LLC (2020), FireEye, Inc (2019), Symantec Corporation (2018), 
Security Compass (2020), Cisco (2019), and other companies heavily rely 
on automation to push their information-value to the stakeholder. Many of 
these solutions are customized and integrated to include multiple systems, 
networks, and cyberspace operations, as well as presented in such a 
manner to make management centralized and easy for the organization. 
• Palo Alto Networks Inc. (2019) centralizes control and integrates every 
acquisition into everything it does. It is specific in the technologies 
acquired, what it brings to the product, and how it is integrated into every 
solution and every system. 
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• Many organizations include R&D strategies, of which the best include the 
purpose and goal of the research and investments that reflect the 
commitment to that goal. 
 Automation and Data Analytics 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the focus for the NDS and DOD Cyber Strategy on 
automation are to gain military advantage, identify malicious cyber activity, and improve 
defensive posture. This focus misses out on many automated capabilities available in the 
private sector, such as medical advances, HR processes, maintenance life cycles. Many 
forms of automation are designed to comb through data faster than a human can, and many 
organizations present the capability to apply to a spectrum of problem sets. These included: 
Splunk Inc (2020), Security Compass (2020), McAfee LLC (2020), Ixia (2016), and others. 
As mentioned, Splunk specifically mentions the capability to incorporate any type of data 
from any source. This could apply very specifically to the DOD, whose acquisitions have 
come from many variate organizations that may not integrate systematically with each 
other and have proprietary information designs. 
Additionally, cloud services are heavily emphasized, which is only mentioned once 
in the DOD Cyber Strategy (p. 6), and nowhere else in the other DOD/government 
strategies. These are not only storage, but computing solutions, networking, and data 
analytics capabilities. Many large-scale capabilities are being moved to the cloud because 
the amount of processing, tools, and data managed and required are so much larger and 
require more coordination and connection than individual organizations can produce or 
utilize independently. Industry is heavily emphasizing solutions and services in the cloud, 
which is a reasonable expectation to have addressed specifically in the DOD/government 
strategies. Particularly because of inherent security and control risks involved in cloud 
services, in addition to anticipation of costs and storage control, future strategy needs a 
high-level unifying strategy that guides use of cloud services. This is also an opportunity 
to demonstrate where the DOD has applied its own strategy, by highlighting the JEDI 
contract with Microsoft or Amazon (Stewart, 2020). 
89 
 Agility, Speed with Automation, Standardization, and Compliance 
Many examples of agility include automation. Speed generally is related to 
automatic Feedback systems that incorporate data to push back out to customers. Systems 
achieving both agility and speed tend to include some mechanism, such as a dashboard, 
alert, or report, for diagnosing issues, vulnerabilities, and potential threats, and for 
integrating intelligence from other sources. Agility, if not mentioned by name specifically, 
is usually in reference to adaptation to the environment in relation to a cyberspace threat. 
The actions taken are usually integrated with other data, tracked, and performed at speed. 
The word “rapid” is used regularly across many organizations and is regularly used as a 
measure of effectiveness and as a timeline for achievement. Key to this observation is 
significant use of automation, where the system could adapt on its own, or changes realized 
outside the system could be updated automatically, seamlessly, and transparently without 
waiting for an administrator to do the work manually. These capabilities are then associated 
with a decreased burden on the customer’s workforce, while still working at the speed of 
the machine. Nearly every industry strategy studied included some measure of speed, 
agility, and automation throughout their systems. 
Change in regulations is acknowledged in a few organizations, which support the 
customer by determining applicability of the regulations to the customer and working to 
bring the customer’s systems into compliance. The NCS notes several times that the 
government must adhere to its own regulations and adopt best practices that are required 
of the private sector. It is reasonable to expect ongoing changes and updates with 
government regulation and changes in standardization to be reflected in the strategy. It can 
be argued that the language in the NDS, which refers to “frequent modular upgrades (p. 
10),” covers this reality. However, compliance and standard changes can require significant 
or costly technology overhauls and might be larger than a modular upgrade. This becomes 
a risk that tends to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
 Strategic Specificity 
Many of the organizations included examples of successful efforts and major 
products to highlight their focus. This specificity made the strategy clearer as to the 
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direction the organization is heading and where resources are prioritized. While this may 
not be directly addressed at UUCCS, the bolstering of all strategy is of benefit. For 
example, Intel Corporation’s report (2019) announced a significant shift to a type of 
memory chip and represented the dollar amount invested in the development for the past 
several years. Several organizations provided the estimated millions of dollars invested in 
Research and Development, with several initiatives defined to have a specific purpose. 
Strategies of Security Compass Inc. (2020), Bank of America (2020) and a few others were 
very specific in efforts to incorporate Feedback mechanisms into productivity and 
discussed precisely who and how that mechanism functioned. Multiple organizations 
discussed their acquisitions or divestiture of smaller companies with clarification on what 
this brought to the overall strategy. Most of the acquisitions are to further develop a product 
or service, and some divestitures are pure business capital decisions. 
The more specific strategies also used percentages as goals. These included 
achievement of previous goals as an orientation and a MOS/MOE, as well as a goal for the 
future. General Electric Company (2019) demonstrated an achievement of a specific 
growth goal and how much the goal is surpassed as a measure of effectiveness (p. 4). These 
measures of success clearly demonstrated strategic metrics utilized by the organization. 
Similar metrics utilized within the DOD/government may bolster cyberspace strategy more 
effectively if included. 
Some of the strategies are differentiated to where the capability, service, or product 
pushed or pulled the daily work. Some strategies provided a packaged and standardized 
system, such as McAfee’s (2020) security application. Others offered capability or product 
that is standardized or customized, such as Optimal IDM (2020) to allow the customer to 
utilize the capability as desired. This pushed the daily workload to the customer. Others 
are designed to act as a service that performed the work on behalf of the customer by 
pulling data and Feedback from sensors, processing and analyzing the information and 
pushing results as value to the customer. Several, such as the aforementioned McAfee, had 
both capabilities depending on the customer. These strategies are well defined and 
demonstrated the goal and application of the expertise of the organization. 
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Only a few strategies included a differentiation between what leadership is going 
to do versus what other employees are expected to do. General Electric Company (2019) 
is one such organization that historically has emphasized leadership, and included a large 
section discussing new efforts within the leadership to improve the overall organization. 
This included collaboration at a high level, as well as leaders working with subordinates. 
Cisco (2019) included a significant section that highlighted its leadership and their 
capabilities. The annual report used is not their official business strategy but reflected the 
values and emphasis of the organization. 
The NCS highlights risk management and assessment throughout the document, 
and the NDS and DOD Cyberspace strategies refer to a transition to a culture that takes 
measured risks. The USCYBERCOM Command Vision however has an entire section 
dedicated to risk management, with specific and real vulnerabilities and how the 
organization would approach it. To compare to industry, Bank of America (2020) 
emphasized a specific risk management framework at the beginning of its strategy to 
encompass, repeat, and frame the remainder of its strategy. Cisco (2019) established its 
own framework and standardized its use in its organization. A similar approach is not 
visible in the DOD/government strategies. 
Change Management practices are specifically mentioned by Tesla (2019), 
acknowledging the science of change. Similarly, many organizations like Microsoft 
Corporation (2019) included strategies that updated business processes. The DOD/
government strategies do include sections about updating business practices and best 
practices, and so are similar. In the future, the field of CM research and other examples of 
CM in industry may provide specific models to adapt the DOD cyberspace strategy for 
UUCCS. This would likely require more in-depth research into large organizations for 
implementation efforts to compare global and disparate element integration and use those 
best practices. 
Overall, the observed specificity within the industry strategies is higher than the 
DOD/government strategies. This specificity provides stronger direction to decision 
makers, managers, and employees in utilization, acquisition, partnerships, and Timelines. 
Additionally, customers, investors, and partners have a better idea as to what to expect 
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from the organization based on the strategy, increasing the trust required to solidify such a 
relationship. 
 Strategic Communication 
Much of the data analyzed represented a form of strategic communication, either to 
stakeholders and investors, customers, or reflected the internal strategy for the 
organization. Most are obtained via annual reporting, in an investor’s annual report or SEC 
filing Form 10-K. Language specific to that year’s activities demonstrated at least some 
effort to revisit the strategy by the organization, and in many cases clearly demonstrated 
the past year’s success and the future year’s goals. When changing circumstances compel 
an organization response, a change in the published strategy communicates to the 
stakeholders the direction of the organization. Updating the strategy more iteratively and 
publishing regularly demonstrates a higher commitment by industry to strategic 
communication compared to the less frequent updating of DOD and government strategies, 
particularly given the rate that cyberspace changes. The literature reflects industry’s push 
toward iterative changes,28 which more closely reflects the cycle of change. At the time of 
publication of this thesis, the DOD/government cyberspace strategies had not been updated 
since 2018, a period of two years and counting, though some high-level government efforts, 
such as the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (King and Gallagher, 2020), show 
movement toward updating the cyberspace strategy. 
 Partnerships 
Many industry partnerships mentioned in the strategies have a specific purpose. 
Some are explained as contractual relationships, as part of the supply chain, or as 
compliments to capability. Some of the partnerships mentioned are clearly part of an 
acquisition strategy. Some of the partnerships are designed to outsource certain types of 
work, including customer service, marketing, data sources, or as a major consumer of the 
organization’s product to create a higher-level product.  
 
28 See Chapter II.B.1. 
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Additionally, some partnerships, such as those of FireEye (2019) and Apple Inc 
(2019), are discussed as “ecosystems,” apparently associated by mutual benefit rather than 
by contract. When defined further, these included customers who interacted with each other 
as well. Splunk Inc. (2020) is particularly specific that its customizable product is designed 
to integrate third-party products and provides multiple forums for support from these third-
party designers, customers, and customer service. This example is the most specific of all 
case studies included and demonstrated a particular effort to include outside entities as part 
of corporate strategy. Integration of customers-assisting-customers and third parties 
contributing to each other’s products through their forums goes beyond standard customer 
service.  
While the government’s efforts at partnerships in strategy have some purpose 
attached, thinking of some partnerships as “ecosystems” as described by these industry 
organizations may provide more best practices to adopt and include in later iterations of 
DOD/government strategy. This model may be especially useful in providing definitions 
of who is a strategic partner and who might be excluded for engagement at a lower level. 
 Innovation 
In a resource constrained environment, where there is not enough time, money, 
manpower or expertise to attack all problems, innovation to solve key problems would be 
particularly useful, as opposed to a more open-ended imperative to innovate for agility. 
Technologically, clarification for innovation that might guide resource prioritization is left 
rather open ended. Despite the aspirations to cause change, the sheer massive size of the 
DOD and its traditional, bureaucratic, and repeatable processes are generally resistant to 
change such as structural organization changes, experimentation, and risk taking. Many 
organizations, like Intel Corporation (2019) and Splunk Inc (2020), are specific in what 
their innovations are designed to do, how much they invested resources and expertise, and 
who is involved in the development. A good example is Akamai Technology Inc’s (2019) 
proprietary partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). For the very 
disparate DOD, composed of several developmental agencies and commands, specifying 
roles and responsibilities to increase coordination and interoperability, as well as connect 
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non-R&D commands to the authority, would strengthen the strategy. This strengthening 
would certainly emphasize UUCCS more, bringing R&D efforts to the forefront and 
providing direction for the rest of the DOD to support those efforts and requirements. 
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VI. CONCLUSION ASSESSMENT, LIMITATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION ASSESSMENT 
This thesis has asked: “What lessons can the DOD realize from private sector 
strategies for innovation and change to build better and more robust multi-stakeholder 
cyberspace change strategy that anticipates uncertainty and unpredictable future 
cyberspace change?” The basic answer to this question is:  there are numerous lessons.  
Chapter II discussed the absence of literature to answer this question directly. 
Accordingly, the thesis collated several fields of related work and explored private sector 
experience to generate lessons-learned and recommendations to the DOD. The preceding 
two chapters presented, in some detail, the range of findings from this research and the 
specific lessons they yield. Following are concluding highlights of lessons learned.  
1. Literature Contribution 
The literature provides a wealth of general information on translating private sector 
strategy to public sector strategy, including major elements in change management and 
disruptive innovation theory. Particularly interesting is the disruptive innovation model 
adapted to include the adoption curve, which may provide a model for use in UUCCS and 
predictive methodology. While reflecting change, there is a balance between the necessity 
to adapt and the smaller likelihood that innovative changes will disrupt fundamental 
systems completely or overnight. Literature guidelines include regular iteration of strategy 
at the pace of change, also noted within the NDS. Specific literature recommendations 
include utilizing small teams to iterate solutions quickly until they can be applied more 
broadly across an entire organization.  
2. Industry Specificity Contribution 
Based on the quantitative analysis, while DOD/government strategies are laudable 
in their anticipation of change, industry’s strategies include nearly double the number of 
measures of effectiveness/measures of success, Timelines, Feedback mechanisms, budget 
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contributions, and the corresponding ratios as compared to the DOD/government 
strategies. These measures of implementation corresponded to a higher level of specificity 
as well, decreasing ambiguity. Additionally, methods that adhere to principles of Change 
Management, particularly leadership direction, provide clearer bearings and expectations 
in the organization. To build better and more robust multi-stakeholder strategy, lessons 
learned in this area will improve strategy overall, which will also improve UUCCS.  
3. Integration between Systems, Not Just Operations 
Many of the sampled strategies emphasized integration between systems even more 
than between operations. For UUCCS in the DOD, this emphasis is lacking, glimpsed only 
in providing direction to integrate cyberspace into broader operations. Using the lessons 
and emphasis by industry in integration would likely provide better direction for a future 
DOD cyberspace-specific strategy. This kind of strategy would help address UUCCS by 
centralizing vulnerability assessment, reporting, management, and ongoing updating of 
intelligence reports that keep the user appraised of threats. As sophistication of malicious 
actors has increased over time, the capability to better monitor, mitigate, and respond to 
threats has become more relevant. Centralizing management allows visibility and insight 
into systems, and enables agility of action, because the knowledge of the system and threats 
is better than the current manual and disassociated systems. 
4. Agility and Speed with Automation 
Many industry strategies include agility, adaptation, or speed as part of the product, 
service, or capability. In contrast to DOD/government strategy, which mentions speed and 
agility a few times or in an introduction, agility, adaptation, and speed is regularly repeated 
throughout each strategic section. This repetition highlights more specifically where 
agility, adaption, or speed is to be applied. Specific capabilities might take time to develop, 
so categorizing them carefully helps clarify the objective. Most of the key agile, speedy, 
and adaptable capabilities and services are automated to rapidly update the stakeholder. 
This automation significantly increases the scale at which information, capability, and 
security is delivered. Specifying where to use speed, adaptation, speed, and automation in 
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each strategic section helps UUCCS by increasing focus for each objective, rather than 
utilizing a broad, document-wide application. 
5. Partnerships 
The best partnerships are well defined and included a purpose for the partnership. 
The most specific included what level the partnerships exist at, either contractual, supply, 
an ecosystem of support, channels of sales, distribution, training, or marketing, with some 
performed by the leaders of the organization, and others performed by employees. These 
strategies demonstrated what the goal of the partnership is, what benefit is garnered, and 
how it is currently utilized. 
6. Strategic Communication 
Because of the public nature of industry strategies, they are addressed to multiple 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, investors, and partners. They show where 
the organization has come from and where it is going and do so in each strategic section. 
While individual organizations may have only addressed the data source to a specific 
audience, these reflected the organization’s strategy presented to other stakeholders. Both 
the literature and demonstration by these organizations agree that regular iteration and 
revision of the strategy in response to change, all strategically communicated to 
stakeholders, increased the strength of the strategy. 
These specificities lend strength to and decrease ambiguity within industry 
strategies, all of which could be used to improve UUCCS. 
B. LIMITATIONS: SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCES IN 
ABSTRACTION OF STRATEGY 
The primary caveat of the findings of this thesis is that the research required 
analytical judgments regarding the meanings and contexts of the source documentation. 
Both the quantitative and qualitative assessments of DOD/government and industry 
strategies required interpretations of specific narrative content reflecting divergent 
purposes and functions. In particular, the coding methodology to distill strategy 
quantitatively is sufficiently abstract to permit comparative numerical observations but 
98 
may not represent the effectiveness of the organization’s strategy by doing so. Language 
could have been concise or purposely vague to allow flexibility for subordinates, which 
would have changed the abstract measurements. 
In the industry strategies in particular, much of the data is addressed to potential 
customers or investors, and so required some extrapolation of strategy from the sales pitch. 
The assumption is that if a capability claims to accomplish something, it is part of a 
development strategy—otherwise, it would not have been developed. Because the data are 
not always from the organizations’ official strategies, which may vary from published 
material, results may have been skewed from the real strategy.  
Quantitative assessments attempted to consistently measure the same data points, 
but necessary judgments regarding the definitions, language application, and translation to 
the framework leave room for interpretation. Because of the subjective abstraction process, 
other researchers repeating this process might generate different results. The thesis reports 
all the core data in Appendix B in order to promote efforts to replicate the study. Such 
additional efforts would demonstrate either the robustness of the findings or the sensitivity 
of the findings to these interpretative issues, either of which would productively build on 
the knowledge generated herein.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Future Research Comparing More Similar Strategy Types 
Further research is recommended to compare the classified DOD cyberspace 
strategies to industry proprietary strategies. Not all the industry case studies are focused on 
cyberspace and contributed fewer lessons learned. Focusing on cyberspace leaders’ 
strategies may also contribute higher quality lessons. Additionally, many industry 
strategies referenced separate strategies for “business,” “marketing,” “sales,” “production,” 
etc., pointing to strategic documentation beyond what is made publicly available. Further 
research that compares a proprietary cyberspace strategy to the counterpart DOD strategy 
might provide further insights. 
Also, focusing further into organizations designed for cyberspace, and performing 
a deeper analysis on the effectiveness of proposed strategies, might provide additional 
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lessons or insights not discovered here. The implementation could also be included, 
particularly regarding how effective a broad and disparate organization is at incorporating 
its own cyberspace strategy. 
2. Use the Literature for Unified Models 
Change management and disruptive innovation theory provide models and metrics 
already thoroughly researched. Bringing these into UUCCS in a unified manner across the 
entire organization would standardize efforts and allow for proper measurements against 
the strategy to be performed for proper Feedback and improvements. Disruptive innovation 
theory combined with the adoption curve as presented by Nunes and Downes (2019) may 
provide an excellent hybrid model for product improvement and comparison to other nation 
states for R&D efforts and acquisition prioritization. 
3. Develop an Integrated Cyberspace Systems Strategy 
Industry best practices are to centralize management, monitoring, and assessment 
of systems. The DOD lacks a strategy to do so, emphasizing integration into operations, 
rather than systems. As a natural evolution, simultaneous strategies that integrate into 
operations, update legacy systems, integrate systems and centralize their control are the 
most important best practices recommendations from this research. 
4. Increased Specificity 
DOD/government cyberspace strategy aspires to integration between systems, not 
just operations, partnerships, innovation, agility, speed, and automation. But industry can 
contribute specificity to increase the strength and momentum of those strategies. 
5. Iteration and Strategic Communications 
The National Defense Strategy (2018) aspires to increase experimentation and 
calculated risk-taking (p. 7). More frequent and faster iteration of the strategy allows for 
Feedback to adjust the course and learn from less than optimal and risky decisions. This 
iteration must be then promulgated to the disparate and global force that applies these 
strategies to promote unification of effort. Iterations should demonstrate success and 
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improvement across an entire force, which would allow current status to be observed and 
would permit incorporation of lessons learned and encourage progress.  
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APPENDIX A.  DATA SOURCES 
Appendix A contains the sources utilized for the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of this thesis. Citations that also appear in the text are re-referenced in the List of 
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APPENDIX B.  DATA SPREADSHEETS 
Appendix B includes the assessed and collated data used for analysis. The first 
tables break the Averages and Ratios used to collate data per sector. This is followed by 
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11.58 4.38 0.68 0.38 0.18 2.33 3.84 84.69% 40.54% 39.33% 5.58% 3.30% 1.84%

















































11.07 6.34 1.34 1.38 0.33 1.69 3.36 68.47% 9.09% 59.02% 13.72% 13.29% 3.07%
























National Defense Strategy Strategic Approach 1 of 37 5 1 0.17 0 0 0 0 5.17, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredi 1 of 37 5 -1 0.1 0.07 0 0.01 0 -5.18, 1 of 37
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National Defense Strategy Build a More Lethal Force 1 of 37 4 -1 0.12 0.06 0.01 0 0 -4.19, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Prioritize Preparedness for War 1 of 37 4 1 0.19 0.17 0.01 0 0 4.37, 1 of 37
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National Defense Strategy missile defense 1 of 37 3 1 0.04 0 0 0 0.01 3.05, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy joint lethality in contested environments 1 of 37 5 1 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 5.05, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy forward force maneuver and posture resilience 1 of 37 4 1 0.14 0.12 0 0 0.02 4.28, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy advanced autonomous systems 1 of 37 5 1 0.04 0.01 0 0 0.01 5.06, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy resilient and agile logistics 1 of 37 3 -1 0.07 0.01 0 0 0.1 -3.18, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Evolve innovative operational concepts. 1 of 37 5 1 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 5.13, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and 1 of 37 4 -1 0.35 0.2 0.03 0 0.01 -4.59, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Cultivate workforce talent 1 of 37 3 -1 0.07 0.02 0 0 0 -3.09, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Professional Military Education 1 of 37 3 -1 0.14 0.05 0 0 0 -3.19, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Talent Management 1 of 37 3 -1 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 -3.07, 1 of 37
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National Defense Strategy Expand Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships 1 of 37 5 -1 0.09 0.05 0 0 0 -5.14, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance 1 of 37 4 1 0.07 0.02 0.01 0 0 4.1, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East. 1 of 37 4 -1 0.12 0.05 0 0 0 -4.17, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere 1 of 37 2 -1 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 -2.02, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Support relationships to address significant terrorist th   1 of 37 4 -1 0.13 0.09 0 0 0 -4.22, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Reform the Department for Greater Performance and 1 of 37 4 -1 0.06 0.06 0 0.01 0 -4.13, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Deliver performance at the speed of relevance 1 of 37 5 1 0.09 0.05 0.01 0 0 5.15, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Organize for innovation 1 of 37 5 -1 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 -5.14, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Drive budget discipline and affordability to achieve so 1 of 37 4 -1 0.24 0.08 0 0.01 0 -4.33, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Streamline rapid, iterative approaches from developme   1 of 37 5 1 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 5.22, 1 of 37
National Defense Strategy Harness and protect the national security innovation ba1 of 37 1 1 0.07 0.08 0.01 0 0.01 1.17, 1 of 37
The DoD Cyber Strategy Strategic competition in cyberspace 1 of 23 4 1 0.09 0 0 0 0 4.09, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy ensure US Military ability to fight and win wars in any   1 of 23 5 1 0.19 0.07 0 0 0 5.26, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy preempt, defeat, or determailicious cyber activity targ    1 of 23 3 1 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 3.12, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy strengthen cyber capacity, expand combined cyberspac      1 of 23 4 1 0.03 0.04 0 0 0 4.07, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy defending civilian assets that enable US Military advan1 of 23 4 1 0.13 0.04 0.03 0 0 4.2, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy Accelerate cyber capability development 1 of 23 5 1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0 0 5.14, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy innovate to foster agility 1 of 23 5 1 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 5.16, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy leverage automation and data analysis to improve effec1 of 23 5 1 0.07 0.06 0.02 0 0 5.15, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy employ COTs cyber capabilities 1 of 23 5 1 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 5.03, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy deter malicious cyber activities 1 of 23 5 1 0.09 0.01 0 0.01 0 5.11, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy persistently contest malicious cyber activity in day-to  1 of 23 4 1 0.1 0.04 0 0 0 4.14, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy increase resilience of US Critical infastructure 1 of 23 3 1 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 3.12, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy build trusted private sector partnerships 1 of 23 4 1 0.04 0.02 0 0 0 4.06, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy operationalize international partnerships 1 of 23 4 1 0.06 0.06 0 0 0 4.12, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy reinforce norms of responsible State behavior in cybe 1 of 23 5 1 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 5.18, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy incorporate cyber awareness into DoD institutional cu1 of 23 2 1 0.08 0.07 0.01 0 0 2.16, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy increase cybersecurity accountability 1 of 23 2 1 0.04 0 0 0 0 2.04, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy seek material solutions that are affordable, flexible, an  1 of 23 4 1 0.09 0.07 0.02 0 0 4.18, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy expand crowd-sourced vulnerability identification 1 of 23 5 1 0.04 0.03 0 0.01 0 5.08, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy sustain a ready cyber workforce 1 of 23 4 1 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 4.23, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy enhances the nation's cyber talent 1 of 23 4 1 0.13 0.06 0 0.01 0 4.2, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy embed software and hardware expertise as a core DoD 1 of 23 5 1 0.09 0.04 0 0 0 5.13, 1 of 23
The DoD Cyber Strategy establish a cyber top talent management program 1 of 23 5 1 0.09 0.04 0 0 0 5.13, 1 of 23
USCYBERCOM Vision Superiority through persistence 1 of 9 4 1 0.42 0.29 0.04 0.01 0 4.76, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision commander's intent 1 of 9 5 1 0.36 0.1 0.01 0 0 5.47, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision Achieve and sustain overmatch of adversary capabilitie1 of 9 5 1 0.09 0.05 0.01 0 0 5.15, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision create cyberspace advantages to enhance operations in  1 of 9 5 1 0.07 0.03 0.02 0 0 5.12, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision create information advantages to support operational o   1 of 9 3 1 0.09 0.02 0 0 0 3.11, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision operationalize the battlespace for agile and responsive 1 of 9 4 1 0.08 0 0.01 0 0 4.09, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision expand, deepen, and operationalize partnerships 1 of 9 4 1 0.17 0 0.01 0 0 4.18, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision Risk mitigation 1 of 9 4 1 0.18 0.01 0 0.01 0 4.2, 1 of 9
USCYBERCOM Vision Implementation 1 of 9 3 1 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.04 0 3.31, 1 of 9
























National Cyber Strategy Protect the American people, the homeland and the am    1 of 56 1 1 0.11 0 0.01 0 0 1.12, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy secure Federal Networks and information 1 of 56 2 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 2.1, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy Further cetnralize managementa and oversight of feder   1 of 56 3 1 0.15 0.04 0 0.01 0.01 3.21, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy align risk management and information technology act1 of 56 3 1 0.11 0.07 0 0.03 0.03 3.24, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy improve federal supply chain risk management 1 of 56 4 1 0.1 0.05 0 0.01 0 4.16, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy strengthen federal contractor cybersecurity 1 of 56 4 1 0.1 0.04 0 0.03 0 4.17, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy ensure government leads in best and innovative practic1 of 56 5 1 0.13 0.03 0.01 0 0 5.17, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy secure critical infastrucutre 1 of 56 4 1 0.05 0.03 0 0.01 0 4.09, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy refine roles and responsibiltiies 1 of 56 3 1 0.08 0.04 0 0 0 3.12, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy prioritize actions according to identified national risks1 of 56 4 1 0.06 0.01 0 0.01 0 4.08, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy leverage information and communications technology    1 of 56 5 1 0.17 0.08 0 0.01 0 5.26, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy protect our democracy 1 of 56 3 1 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 3.17, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy incentivize cybersecurity investments 1 of 56 3 1 0.05 0.04 0 0 0 3.09, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy prioritize national research and development investme 1 of 56 4 1 0.07 0.03 0 0 0.01 4.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy improve transportation and maritime cybersecurity 1 of 56 4 1 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0 4.09, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy improve space cybersecurity 1 of 56 4 1 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 0 4.1, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy combat cybercrime and improve incident reporting 1 of 56 3 1 0.1 0.04 0.01 0 0 3.15, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy improve incident reporting and response 1 of 56 3 1 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 3.03, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy modernize electronic surveillance and computer crime 1 of 56 2 1 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 2.08, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy reduce threats from transnational criminal organizatio   1 of 56 2 1 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 2.04, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy improve apprehension of criminals located abroad 1 of 56 3 1 0.08 0.03 0 0 0 3.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy strengthen partner nations' law enforcement capacity t    1 of 56 4 1 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 4.15, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy Promote American prosperity 1 of 56 1 1 0.06 0 0 0 0 1.06, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy foster a vibrant and resilient digital economy 1 of 56 2 1 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 2.07, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy incentivize on adaptable and secure technology market1 of 56 4 1 0.13 0.04 0 0.01 0 4.18, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy prioritze innovation 1 of 56 5 1 0.09 0.01 0 0 0 5.1, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy invest in next generation infastructure 1 of 56 5 1 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.01 0 5.23, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote the free flow of data across borders 1 of 56 4 1 0.08 0.03 0 0 0 4.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy maintain US leadership in emerging technologies 1 of 56 5 1 0.09 0.06 0 0 0 5.15, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote full-lifecycle cybersecurity 1 of 56 5 1 0.2 0.04 0 0 0 5.24, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy foster and protect US ingenuity 1 of 56 4 1 0.09 0.03 0 0 0 4.12, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy update mechanisms to review foreign investment and o    1 of 56 2 1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0 2.05, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy maintain a strong and balanced intellectual property pr  1 of 56 3 -1 0.06 0 0 0 0 -3.06, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy protect the confidentiality and integrity of american id1 of 56 1 1 0.02 0 0 0.01 0 1.03, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy develop a superior cybersecurity workforce 1 of 56 1 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 1.02, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy build and sustain the talent pipeline 1 of 56 2 1 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 2.06, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy expand re-skilling and educational opportunities for A  1 of 56 2 1 0.08 0.01 0 0 0 2.09, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy enhance the Federal Cybersecurity workforce 1 of 56 2 1 0.15 0.02 0 0 0.01 2.18, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy use executive authority to highlight and reward talent 1 of 56 2 1 0.09 0.02 0 0 0 2.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy Preserve Peace through strength 1 of 56 4 1 0.13 0.01 0 0 0 4.14, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy enhance cyber stability through Norms of responsible  1 of 56 0 1 0.04 0.02 0 0 0.06, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy encourage Universal adhereance to cyber norms 1 of 56 1 1 0.03 0.08 0 0 0 1.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy attribute and deter unaccepbable behavior in cyberspac1 of 56 5 1 0.19 0.05 0.01 0 0 5.25, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy lead with objective collaboration intelligence 1 of 56 5 1 0.13 0.09 0 0 0 5.22, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy impose consequences 1 of 56 4 1 0.09 0.03 0.01 0 0 4.13, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy build a cyber deterrence initiative 1 of 56 4 1 0.09 0.02 0 0 0 4.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy counter malign cyber influence and information opera 1 of 56 4 1 0.15 0.07 0 0 0 4.22, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy Advance American influence 1 of 56 1 1 0.12 0 0 0 0 1.12, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote an open, interoperable, reliable and secure in 1 of 56 4 1 0.07 0.01 0 0 0 4.08, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy protect and promote internet freedom 1 of 56 1 1 0.01 0 0 0 0 1.01, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy work with like-minded countries, industry, academia, a   1 of 56 1 1 0.11 0.01 0 0 0 1.12, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote a multi-stakeholder model of internet govern1 of 56 4 1 0.13 0.04 0 0 0 4.17, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote interoperable and reliable communications in    1 of 56 4 1 0.06 0.04 0 0 0 4.1, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy promote and maintain markets for US ingenuity worldw1 of 56 4 1 0.17 0.06 0 0 0 4.23, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy build international cyber capacity 1 of 56 4 1 0.01 0.1 0 0 0 4.11, 1 of 56
National Cyber Strategy enhance cyber capacity building efforts 1 of 56 5 1 0.18 0.05 0 0 0 5.23, 1 of 56
























Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Provide general governance and management direction IAW D     1 of 12 2 -1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 -2.08, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Implement and oversee open space conservation… etc. 1 of 12 2 -1 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 0 -2.22, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Assist Budget and Finance Committee to achieve fiscal stabili     1 of 12 2 -1 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -2.11, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Actively participate in development of future DMFS managem       1 of 12 4 -1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 -4.14, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Develop plans and programs to obtain financial support for DM           1 of 12 2 1 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 2.16, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Develop DM Forest education plans and programs 1 of 12 2 1 0.09 0.04 0 0.02 0 2.15, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Support scientific forest and environmental research program1 of 12 0 -1 0.01 0.05 0 0 0.01 -0.07, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Provide oversight for management of DMFC's financial resou1 of 12 3 -1 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.07 0 -3.32, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Serve as a resource for election and retention of directors w/          1 of 12 2 -1 0.03 0.01 0.02 0 0 -2.06, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Develop a plan to create a smooth transition for newly appoin   1 of 12 3 -1 0.02 0.03 0.01 0 0 -3.06, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Coordinate independent audits or reviews of DMFC's financia                    1 of 12 2 -1 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.03 0 -2.15, 1 of 12
Del Monte Forest Conservancy Strategic Plan Plan of Management and Professional Organization 1 of 12 3 -1 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 0 -3.2, 1 of 12
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Our Business Strategy 1 of 13 4 1 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 4.06, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Continue to expand our addressable markets 1 of 13 4 1 0.05 0 0 0 0 4.05, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Maintain focus on technology leadership 1 of 13 5 1 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 5.14, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Expand and further penetrate customer base 1 of 13 5 1 0.14 0.05 0 0 0 5.19, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Expand international Market Presence 1 of 13 5 -1 0.07 0 0 0 0 -5.07, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 License and acquire new products 1 of 13 5 1 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 5.07, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Our Solutions (product strategy) 1 of 13 4 1 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.06 0 4.22, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Competition <strategy> 1 of 13 4 1 0.1 0.08 0.01 0 0 4.19, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Sales, Marketing and Technical Support <strategy> 1 of 13 1 -1 0.27 0.1 0.02 0 0 -1.39, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Manufacturing and Supply Ops 1 of 13 4 1 0.23 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 4.29, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Research and Development 1 of 13 5 1 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 5.19, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Intellectual property and proprietary rights 1 of 13 5 1 0.15 0.08 0 0.01 0 5.24, 1 of 13
Ixia Annual Report 10K 2016 Employees 1 of 13 1 -1 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 -1.03, 1 of 13
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2019 Insurance Broking and Risk Consulting 1 of 16 3 -1 0.16 0.02 0 0 0 -3.18, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2019 Risk Management 1 of 16 3 -1 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 -3.07, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2019 Corporate 1 of 16 2 -1 0.09 0.01 0 0 0 -2.1, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2019 Commercial & Consumer 1 of 16 2 -1 0.08 0.01 0.01 0 0 -2.1, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2020 High Net Worth 1 of 16 2 -1 0.04 0 0 0 0 -2.04, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2022 health 1 of 16 2 -1 0.05 0 0 0 0 -2.05, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2023 wealth 1 of 16 1 -1 0.07 0 0 0 0 -1.07, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2024 Career 1 of 16 2 -1 0.08 0.04 0 0 0 -2.12, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2026 Risk and Insurance Services 1 of 16 1 -1 0.03 0 0 0 0 -1.03, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2027 Consulting 1 of 16 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2028 Risks relating to the company generally 1 of 16 4 -1 0.02 0.03 0 0 0 -4.05, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2029 Competitive Risks - technology change 1 of 16 3 1 0.08 0.04 0 0 0 3.12, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2030 Competitive Risks - Culture and reputation 1 of 16 3 -1 0.11 0.05 0 0 0 -3.16, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2031 Competitive Risks - Talent management 1 of 16 5 -1 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 -5.07, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2032 cybersecurity and data protection risks 1 of 16 4 1 0.05 0 0 0 0 4.05, 1 of 16
Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. 10-K 2033 Business Resiliency Risk 1 of 16 4 1 0.04 0 0 0 0 4.04, 1 of 16
Intel 2018 Annual Report Our Strategy 1 of 17 5 1 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 5.12, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Make the World's Best semiconductors 1 of 17 5 1 0.19 0.11 0.01 0 0 5.31, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Lead the AI and Autonomous Revolution 1 of 17 5 1 0.09 0.06 0 0.09 0 5.24, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Be the leading end-to-end platform provider for the new data w1 of 17 5 1 0.29 0.1 0 0.02 0 5.41, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report relentless focus on operational excellence and efficiency 1 of 17 3 -1 0.13 0.07 0 0 0 -3.2, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Continue to hire, develop and retain the best, most diverse an  1 of 17 4 -1 0.12 0.09 0.01 0 0 -4.22, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Our Capital 1 of 17 4 1 0.19 0.14 0 0.01 0 4.34, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Financial capital 1 of 17 5 1 0.06 0.01 0 0.01 0 5.08, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Invest in the business 1 of 17 5 1 0.03 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 5.08, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Acquire and integrate 1 of 17 4 -1 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.02 -4.1, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Return cash to stockholders 1 of 17 3 -1 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.04 -3.12, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report intellectual capital 1 of 17 4 1 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.02 0 4.18, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report Product technology (6 areas) 1 of 17 4 1 0.08 0.01 0.01 0 0 4.1, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report manufactured capital 1 of 17 5 1 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 5.15, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report human capital 1 of 17 5 -1 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 0 -5.16, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report social and relationship capital 1 of 17 4 -1 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.05 0 -4.23, 1 of 17
Intel 2018 Annual Report natural capital 1 of 17 1 -1 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 -1.25, 1 of 17
Bank of America we must grow and win in the market - no excuses 1 of 7 1 -1 0.03 0.05 0.01 0 0 -1.09, 1 of 7
Bank of America we must grow with out customer-focused strategy 1 of 7 2 1 0.18 0.15 0 0 0.02 2.35, 1 of 7
Bank of America we must grow within our risk framework 1 of 7 3 -1 0.19 0.1 0.01 0.02 0 -3.32, 1 of 7
Bank of America we must grow in a sustainable manner 1 of 7 2 -1 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0 -2.06, 1 of 7
Bank of America sharing success with the communities we serve 1 of 7 0 -1 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 -0.1, 1 of 7
Bank of America being a great place to work 1 of 7 1 -1 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 -1.11, 1 of 7
Bank of America driving operational excellence 1 of 7 1 -1 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0 -1.1, 1 of 7
Lookingglass Cyber intelligence tradecraft 1 of 6 3 1 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 3.04, 1 of 6
Lookingglass Cyber best-in-class threat intelligence 1 of 6 5 1 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 5.05, 1 of 6
Lookingglass Cyber experienced security & threat analysts 1 of 6 4 1 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 4.07, 1 of 6
Lookingglass Cyber timely, relevant, actionable intelligence 1 of 6 5 1 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0 5.06, 1 of 6
Lookingglass Cyber robust portfolio with choice of delivery model 1 of 6 2 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 2.02, 1 of 6
Lookingglass Cyber about lookingglass cyber solutions 1 of 6 5 1 0.15 0.08 0.01 0 0 5.24, 1 of 6
























Cisco enabling network automation 1 of 8 3 1 0.11 0.03 0.01 0 0 3.15, 1 of 8
Cisco powering a multicloud world 1 of 8 4 1 0.11 0.02 0 0 0 4.13, 1 of 8
Cisco security is foundational 1 of 8 3 1 0.04 0.07 0.01 0 0 3.12, 1 of 8
Cisco unlocking the power of data 1 of 8 4 1 0.01 0.03 0.01 0 0 4.05, 1 of 8
Cisco transforming our business model 1 of 8 4 1 0.04 0.03 0 0.01 0 4.08, 1 of 8
Cisco Diverse leadership 1 of 8 4 -1 0.07 0.06 0.01 0 0 -4.14, 1 of 8
Cisco shareholder engagement 1 of 8 3 -1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 -3.06, 1 of 8
Cisco risk management approach 1 of 8 4 -1 0.13 0.1 0.06 0.06 0 -4.35, 1 of 8
Tesla Impact Report 2018 sustainable and superior products for everyone 1 of 22 0 -1 0.07 0.08 0 0 0 -0.15, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 environmental impact 1 of 22 5 -1 0.06 0.14 0.03 0 0 -5.23, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 resilience of the grid 1 of 22 4 -1 0.05 0.1 0.02 0 0 -4.17, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 access to sustainable energy 1 of 22 2 -1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -2.05, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 building the safest cars from the ground up 1 of 22 3 1 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.02 0 3.27, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 building a sustainable future in a sustainable way 1 of 22 2 -1 0.06 0.03 0.01 0 0.01 -2.11, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 greenhouse gas inventory 1 of 22 2 -1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 -2.05, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 energy efficiency 1 of 22 2 -1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 -2.08, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 sustainable energy 1 of 22 2 -1 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 -2.02, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 superchargers 1 of 22 3 -1 0.04 0.04 0 0.02 0 -3.1, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 responsible sourcing 1 of 22 2 -1 0.05 0.03 0 0.02 0 -2.1, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 conflict minerals 1 of 22 2 -1 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 -2.03, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 supplier diversity 1 of 22 2 -1 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 -2.04, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 becoming the safest car factory in the world 1 of 22 3 -1 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0 -3.18, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 the safest cars for customers and employees 1 of 22 2 -1 0.02 0.02 0 0.05 0 -2.09, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 rewarding the individual 1 of 22 2 -1 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 -2.26, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 diversity and inclusion 1 of 22 2 -1 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 -2.04, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 excellence - the passing grade 1 of 22 2 -1 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.02 0 -2.17, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 employee mobility and transportation programs 1 of 22 2 -1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -2.08, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 education 1 of 22 4 1 0.1 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 4.14, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 corporate governance 1 of 22 0 -1 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.08 0 -0.3, 1 of 22
Tesla Impact Report 2018 drivien by sustainability 1 of 22 3 -1 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01 0 -3.15, 1 of 22
Blackberry/Cylance IoT 1 of 7 4 1 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 4.11, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance Licensing 1 of 7 3 1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 3.05, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance enterprise software and services 1 of 7 3 1 0.08 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 3.14, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance BlackbBerry Technology solutions 1 of 7 3 1 0.08 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 3.14, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance Licensing 1 of 7 2 1 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 2.08, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance BlackBerry Cylance (2nd strategy) 1 of 7 3 1 0.07 0.05 0.01 0 0.02 3.15, 1 of 7
Blackberry/Cylance Opportunity for long term growth 1 of 7 3 -1 0.08 0.03 0.02 0 0 -3.13, 1 of 7
Edgescan SaaS 1 of 12 2 1 0.02 0.03 0.01 0 0 2.06, 1 of 12
Edgescan Hybrid Scalable Assessments 1 of 12 3 1 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 3.04, 1 of 12
Edgescan Analytics & Depth 1 of 12 4 1 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 4.13, 1 of 12
Edgescan Coverage 1 of 12 4 1 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 4.07, 1 of 12
Edgescan support 1 of 12 3 1 0.04 0.02 0 0.01 0 3.07, 1 of 12
Edgescan Vulnerability inelligence 1 of 12 3 1 0.06 0.02 0 0.01 0 3.09, 1 of 12
Edgescan Rich API integration 1 of 12 2 1 0.06 0.06 0 0 0 2.12, 1 of 12
Edgescan One-click WAF 1 of 12 3 1 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 3.02, 1 of 12
Edgescan Alerting 1 of 12 4 1 0.05 0.02 0 0.01 0 4.08, 1 of 12
Edgescan Continuous Asset Profiliing 1 of 12 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0 3.06, 1 of 12
Edgescan Scale 1 of 12 3 1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 3.08, 1 of 12
Edgescan Compliance 1 of 12 2 1 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 2.07, 1 of 12
Security Compass SD Elements 1 of 5 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 3.1, 1 of 5
Security Compass Threat Modeling 1 of 5 3 1 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 3.24, 1 of 5
Security Compass Secure Development 1 of 5 3 1 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.01 3.25, 1 of 5
Security Compass Risk Assessments 1 of 5 4 1 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.05 0 4.26, 1 of 5
Security Compass Compliance 1 of 5 4 1 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.07 0 4.3, 1 of 5
Microsoft Annual Report/10K Embracing our future 1 of 6 4 1 0.16 0.08 0 0 0 4.24, 1 of 6
Microsoft Annual Report/10K what we offer 1 of 6 4 1 0.2 0.01 0 0 0 4.21, 1 of 6
Microsoft Annual Report/10K reinvent productivity and business processes 1 of 6 4 1 0.23 0.2 0.01 0 0 4.44, 1 of 6
Microsoft Annual Report/10K build the intelligent cloud and intelligent edge platform 1 of 6 4 1 0.21 0.26 0.01 0.02 0 4.5, 1 of 6
Microsoft Annual Report/10K create more personal computing 1 of 6 4 1 0.29 0.14 0.01 0.04 0 4.48, 1 of 6
Microsoft Annual Report/10K our future opportunity 1 of 6 5 1 0.33 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.05 5.59, 1 of 6
AT&T 10K Areas of Focus 1 of 7 4 1 0.07 0.07 0.01 0 0 4.15, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K Communications 1 of 7 3 1 0.07 0.06 0.01 0 0 3.14, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K wireless service 1 of 7 3 1 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.01 0 3.37, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K broadband technology 1 of 7 4 1 0.04 0.05 0.01 0 0 4.1, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K Media 1 of 7 4 1 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 4.19, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K Advertising 1 of 7 3 1 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 3.1, 1 of 7
AT&T 10K Latin America 1 of 7 3 1 0.03 0.04 0 0 0 3.07, 1 of 7
Optimal IDM Website Customizable solutions 1 of 8 4 1 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.01 0 4.2, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website superior customer service & support 1 of 8 4 1 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0 4.14, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website security is foundational 1 of 8 3 1 0.05 0.06 0 0 0 3.11, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website scalability 1 of 8 2 1 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 2.02, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website savings 1 of 8 2 1 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0 2.04, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website managed services 1 of 8 3 1 0.05 0.02 0 0.01 0 3.08, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website speed 1 of 8 3 1 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 0 3.1, 1 of 8
Optimal IDM Website stability 1 of 8 2 1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 0 2.04, 1 of 8
























Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k general 1 of 8 3 1 0.27 0.21 0 0 0 3.48, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k product, subscription and support offerings 1 of 8 4 1 0.43 0.08 0.03 0 0 4.54, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k technology 1 of 8 3 1 0.06 0.07 0 0 0 3.13, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k Research and Development 1 of 8 5 1 0.1 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01 5.27, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k intellectual property 1 of 8 4 -1 0.13 0.1 0.01 0.02 0 -4.26, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k sales, customer support and marketing 1 of 8 4 -1 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 -4.27, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k manufacturing 1 of 8 3 1 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0 3.16, 1 of 8
Palo Alto Networks Form 10-k employees 1 of 8 3 -1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0 -3.05, 1 of 8
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K business Strategy 1 of 11 3 1 0.2 0.2 0.01 0 0 3.41, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K enterprise security portfolio: integrated cyber defense 1 of 11 2 1 0.11 0.01 0 0 0 2.12, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K core services 1 of 11 3 1 0.09 0.07 0 0.02 0 3.18, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K control points 1 of 11 3 1 0.2 0.15 0 0.01 0 3.36, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K foundation 1 of 11 4 1 0.33 0.18 0.04 0.06 0 4.61, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K consumer digital safety portfolio 1 of 11 4 1 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.03 0 4.47, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K sales and go-to-market strategy 1 of 11 4 -1 0.44 0 0 0 0 -4.44, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K Research and Development 1 of 11 5 1 0.19 0.06 0.05 0 0.02 5.32, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K product and technical support 1 of 11 3 -1 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.04 0 -3.27, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K intellectual property: protective measures 1 of 11 3 -1 0.2 0.05 0.02 0 0 -3.27, 1 of 11
Symantec Corporation Form 10-K intellectual property: trademarks, patents, copyrights and lice 1 of 11 4 -1 0.13 0.08 0.02 0 0 -4.23, 1 of 11
McAfee corporate fact sheet about mcafee 1 of 12 3 1 0.11 0.16 0.01 0 0 3.28, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet customers 1 of 12 4 -1 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.01 0 -4.31, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet home 1 of 12 3 1 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.01 0 3.2, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet small business 1 of 12 3 1 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.01 0 3.17, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet Commercial & Consumer 1 of 12 3 1 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 3.1, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet enterprise 1 of 12 3 1 0.12 0.1 0.01 0.01 0 3.24, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet mobile 1 of 12 3 1 0.1 0.07 0 0 0 3.17, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet cloud 1 of 12 5 1 0.24 0.13 0 0.02 0 5.39, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet integrated, simple-to-manage solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.21 0.1 0.05 0.01 0 5.37, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet professional services and support 1 of 12 4 -1 0.1 0.07 0.02 0.03 0 -4.22, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet research 1 of 12 5 1 0.13 0.07 0.01 0 0 5.21, 1 of 12
McAfee corporate fact sheet innovation 1 of 12 5 1 0.15 0.24 0.02 0.01 0 5.42, 1 of 12
Apple Inc Form 10-K iphone 1 of 13 2 1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 2.07, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K Mac 1 of 13 2 1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 2.07, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K iPad 1 of 13 2 1 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0 2.09, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K wearables, home and accessories 1 of 13 3 1 0.08 0.02 0.02 0 0 3.12, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K digital content stores and streaming services 1 of 13 3 1 0.11 0.04 0.01 0 0 3.16, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K AppleCare 1 of 13 2 1 0.05 0 0 0 0 2.05, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K iCloud 1 of 13 3 1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 3.07, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K licensing 1 of 13 1 -1 0.02 0 0 0 0 -1.02, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K other services 1 of 13 2 1 0.04 0 0 0 0 2.04, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K Markets and distribution 1 of 13 3 -1 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -3.16, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K supply of components 1 of 13 3 1 0.12 0.05 0.01 0 0 3.18, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K Research and Development 1 of 13 5 1 0.1 0.04 0.02 0 0 5.16, 1 of 13
Apple Inc Form 10-K intellectual property 1 of 13 3 -1 0.23 0.08 0.04 0.01 0 -3.36, 1 of 13
GE Corporation annual report improve our financial position 1 of 9 2 -1 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.13 -2.55, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report strengthen our businesses 1 of 9 3 -1 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.02 0 -3.25, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report lean management 1 of 9 4 -1 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.05 0 -4.3, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report potential opportunities 1 of 9 4 -1 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.02 -4.43, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report power 1 of 9 4 1 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.02 0 4.3, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report renewable energy 1 of 9 4 1 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.04 0 4.25, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report aviation 1 of 9 3 1 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 3.25, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report healthcare 1 of 9 3 1 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 3.25, 1 of 9
GE Corporation annual report path to growth 1 of 9 5 1 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 5.23, 1 of 9
Akamai Form 10-K our strategy 1 of 12 5 1 0.35 0.3 0.02 0.05 0 5.72, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K our solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.08 0.04 0.02 0 0 5.14, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K cloud security solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.3 0.14 0.01 0.01 0 5.46, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K enterprise security solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.12 0.09 0.02 0 0 5.23, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K web and mobile performance solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.3 0.27 0.08 0.12 0 5.77, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K media delivery solutions 1 of 12 3 1 0.22 0.2 0.04 0.05 0 3.51, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K carrier solutions 1 of 12 5 1 0.38 0.14 0.01 0.01 0 5.54, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K services and support solutions 1 of 12 4 1 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.06 0 4.41, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K our technology and network 1 of 12 5 1 0.3 0.24 0.02 0.06 0 5.62, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K customers 1 of 12 3 -1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 -3.15, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K sales, services and marketing 1 of 12 4 -1 0.25 0.03 0.01 0 0 -4.29, 1 of 12
Akamai Form 10-K proprietary rights and licensing 1 of 12 4 -1 0.16 0.03 0.03 0 0 -4.22, 1 of 12
























FireEye Inc Form 10-K General 1 of 26 5 1 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.01 5.42, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K our cybersecurity solutions and services 1 of 26 4 1 0.29 0.03 0.07 0 0 4.39, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K threat detection and prevention solutions 1 of 26 4 1 0.25 0.1 0 0.01 0 4.36, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K network security and network forensics solutions 1 of 26 3 1 0.17 0.1 0.02 0.01 0 3.3, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K email security solutions 1 of 26 3 1 0.28 0.06 0 0.01 0 3.35, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K endpoint security solutions 1 of 26 3 1 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 3.3, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K cloud security solutions 1 of 26 3 1 0.1 0.07 0 0.01 0 3.18, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K customer support and maintenance services 1 of 26 4 1 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.05 0 4.21, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K helix security platform 1 of 26 5 1 0.23 0.11 0.01 0.03 0 5.38, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K security validation platform 1 of 26 3 1 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.02 0 3.26, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K threat intelligence solutions 1 of 26 4 1 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 4.21, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K on-demand and managed service-as-a-service solutions 1 of 26 5 1 0.2 0.08 0.03 0.03 0 5.34, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K professional services 1 of 26 3 1 0.23 0 0 0.12 0 3.35, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K our technologies 1 of 26 5 1 0.13 0.04 0 0.01 0 5.18, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K advanced threat detection and prevention technologies 1 of 26 5 1 0.18 0.03 0 0 0 5.21, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K advanced endpoint validation and containment 1 of 26 4 1 0.13 0 0.02 0.01 0 4.16, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K security validation 1 of 26 3 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 3.04, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K evolved security architecture and security orchestration 1 of 26 5 1 0.26 0.11 0.01 0.02 0 5.4, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K customers 1 of 26 3 -1 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 -3.29, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K sales 1 of 26 4 -1 0.44 0.19 0.03 0.05 0 -4.71, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K marketing 1 of 26 3 -1 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 -3.31, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K technology alliance partners 1 of 26 5 1 0.18 0.1 0.01 0.01 0 5.3, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K government affairs 1 of 26 5 -1 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0 -5.27, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K manufacturing 1 of 26 3 1 0.17 0.05 0.1 0.03 0 3.35, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K Research and Development 1 of 26 5 1 0.43 0.26 0.03 0.11 0.02 5.85, 1 of 26
FireEye Inc Form 10-K intellectual property 1 of 26 4 -1 0.25 0.06 0.02 0 0 -4.33, 1 of 26
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form AIOPS: Artificial Intelligence for IT operations 1 of 38 5 1 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.01 0 5.35, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form The Splunk Analytics-Driven Solution 1 of 38 5 1 0.31 0.24 0.02 0 0 5.57, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Security Nerve Center 1 of 38 5 1 0.38 0.26 0.05 0.02 0 5.71, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Get the value out of AI and Machine Learning 1 of 38 5 1 0.32 0.28 0.04 0 0 5.64, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Real-Time Enterprise Log Managmeent to Search, Diagnose,  1 of 38 5 1 0.39 0.32 0.04 0.05 0 5.8, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Platform for Big Data Analytics 1 of 38 5 1 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.03 0 5.3, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form extend our technological capabilties 1 of 38 4 1 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.02 4.32, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form continue to expand our direct and indirect sales organization…1 of 38 4 -1 0.12 0.04 0 0 0.03 -4.19, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form futher penetrate our existing customer base and drive enterpri  1 of 38 3 -1 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 -3.24, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form enhance our value proposition through a focus on solutions wh       1 of 38 4 1 0.11 0.03 0.01 0 0.01 4.16, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Grow our user communities and partner ecosystem to increas    1 of 38 3 -1 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 -3.18, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form continue to deliver a rich developer environment… 1 of 38 5 1 0.07 0.04 0 0 0.01 5.12, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Pricing 1 of 38 3 -1 0.1 0.02 0.03 0 0 -3.15, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form key technologies 1 of 38 1 1 0.07 0.02 0 0 0.01 1.1, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form schema-on-the-fly 1 of 38 5 -1 0.12 0.03 0.02 0 0 -5.17, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form machine data platform 1 of 38 5 1 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.01 0 5.18, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form search processing language 1 of 38 5 1 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01 0 5.21, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form machine learning 1 of 38 5 1 0.09 0.08 0.01 0 0 5.18, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form splunk enterprise and splunk cloud 1 of 38 5 1 0.61 0.24 0.09 0.03 0 5.97, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture collection 1 of 38 3 1 0.21 0.05 0 0 0 3.26, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture indexing 1 of 38 5 1 0.14 0.06 0.01 0 0 5.21, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture search 1 of 38 5 1 0.13 0.06 0 0 0 5.19, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture core functions 1 of 38 5 1 0.13 0.06 0 0 0 5.19, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture archive to hadoop and amazon S3 1 of 38 5 1 0.05 0.03 0.01 0 0 5.09, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture SDKs and APIs 1 of 38 5 1 0.04 0 0 0 0 5.04, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Technology architecture App development environment 1 of 38 5 1 0.09 0.04 0 0 0 5.13, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form splunk product deployments 1 of 38 4 1 0.32 0.24 0.01 0 0 4.57, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form services 1 of 38 3 -1 0.08 0.02 0.02 0 0 -3.12, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form maintenance and customer support 1 of 38 3 -1 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.02 0 -3.29, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form training services 1 of 38 2 -1 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 -2.06, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form professional services 1 of 38 3 -1 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 -3.1, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form partner and developer ecosystem 1 of 38 5 1 0.25 0.14 0.02 0.03 0 5.44, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form splunk communities 1 of 38 5 1 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.1 0 5.4, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form sales 1 of 38 4 -1 0.52 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 -4.7, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form marketing 1 of 38 3 -1 0.23 0.14 0.01 0 0 -3.38, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form Research and Development 1 of 38 5 1 0.11 0.1 0.01 0.02 0.01 5.25, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form intellectual property 1 of 38 3 -1 0.16 0.01 0 0 0 -3.17, 1 of 38
Splunk Strategy and Growth strategy from  Form customers 1 of 38 3 -1 0.17 0.03 0.02 0 0 -3.22, 1 of 38
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